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Chapter I: Migration as a geographical issue 
 
The spatial gap in current work on the Venezuelan diaspora 
The political and economic crisis that has disrupted Venezuela over the past several years 
has engendered a diaspora that has become one of the greatest displaced populations in the 
world, second only to Syria. In fact, more than 5 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants have 
left their country, 4 million of whom have resettled within Latin America or the Caribbean, an 
unprecedented influx for the region. In the past, Venezuela’s strong economy and social 
programs encouraged net immigration; now, it is exporting people.1 Beginning in 2015, dramatic 
declines in Venezuela’s economy created job losses, food insecurity, and violence. As the 
domestic situation became increasingly precarious, more impoverished migrants left the country 
via overland routes, creating a surge in terrestrial border crossings. 2  Not surprisingly, as of May 
of 2020, neighboring Colombia has received the vast majority of Venezuela’s refugees and 
migrants—some 1.7 million. Another 260,000 Venezuelans, however, have crossed into Brazil, 
which is playing an ever-growing role as a recipient country despite there being little historical 
precedent for Venezuela-Brazil migration.3 Critically, this influx is salient because it is primarily 
taking place in the northernmost state of Roraima (see Figure 1) the least populous state and, in 
popular conceptions, one of the most underdeveloped regions in Brazil. 
 
 
1 Chaves-González, Diego, and Carlos Echeverria-Estrada. Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees in Latin America and 
the Caribbean: A Regional Profile. Migration Policy  Institute, 2020, 
www.migrationpolicy.org/research/venezuelans-latin-america-caribbean-regional-profile.  
2 Ibid. 
3 “Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela.” R4V, United Nations High  Commissioner 
for Refugees, 2020, data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/platform.  
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Figure 1: Map of Venezuela and the bordering Brazilian state of Roraima4 
 
A growing body of research is documenting the responses to these unprecedented 
influxes of Venezuelan migrants into Brazil. This work, ranging from academic articles to 
studies conducted by international organizations, encompasses four broad themes: migrants’ 
economic integration into the labor market, access to healthcare, humanitarian coordination 
(including civil society reception of migrants), and migrants’ legal documentation and 
regularization.5 While this work helps to elucidate the immediate problems facing this new surge 
of migrants, it leaves several questions unanswered. For example: beyond the official channels of 
 
4 Lopes, Marina, and Nick Miroff. “Hungry Venezuelans Flood Brazilian Towns, as Threat of Mass Migration 
Looms,” January 1, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/hungry-venezuelans-flood-
brazilian-towns-as-threat-of-mass-migration-looms/2017/01/01/39f85822-c6d1-11e6-acda-
59924caa2450_story.html?utm_term=.dcbbf5f12123.  
5 Selee, Andrew and Jessica Bolter. Migration Policy Institute, 2020, An Uneven Welcome: Latin American and 
Caribbean Responses to Venezuelan and Nicaraguan Migration, 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Venezuela-Nicaragua-Migration2020-EN-Final.pdf 
and Jarochinski Silva, João Carlos. Migrações Venezuelanas. Edited by Rosana Baeninger, Universidade Estadual 
De Campinas, 2018.  
5 
migration established by the Brazilian government, what alternative routes are Venezuelan 
migrants using to flee their country? In what way does the local Brazilian community at the 
border participate in bordering practices? To what extent are migrants able to maintain proximity 
to the border? In short, the spatial elements of the migrant exodus remain seriously 
underexplored. This gap is noticeable, because in contexts of migration from the Global South to 
the Global North, these questions are much more central. In fact, even when reviewing the work 
focusing on the much more expansive migration of Venezuelans into Colombia, these issues 
have already been raised, as evidenced by studies on the transformation of the border as a 
militarized zone6 and strategic location for armed guerrilla agents7.   
 My project addresses this gap by focusing on how the question of mobility and 
immobility impacts Venezuelan migrants in Brazil, in order to better understand the several 
agents that comprise the Brazilian migration regime and how migrants negotiate forms of spatial 
power. I will use this case study of Venezuelans in Brazil to build the case for a dialectic 
between mobility and immobility. Specially, I will:  
1) Trace the history of mobility in the state of Roraima. I will focus primarily on a) the ways 
in which mobility in the region has historically been constructed and practiced in relation 
to Venezuela and the border; and b) how the mobility has also been a key component of 
the Brazilian settler colonial project in the region. Highlighting these points will not only 
allow me to contextualize the current migratory situation, but also demonstrates that 
Roraima is not actually an isolated zone, as many often believe. 
 
6 Martínez, Mario Valero. “La Frontera Colombo-Venezolana: Escenarios De Conflictos.” Nueva Sociedad, no. 289 
(2020): 95–106.  
7 Rodríguez Rodríguez, David. 2021. El impacto de la estrategia del Estado colombiano en la presencia del ELN en 
la frontera colombo-venezolana de Arauca. http://hdl.handle.net/10554/53356 
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2) Analyze the ways in which, and why, the multiple agents that operate at the border aim to 
facilitate the flows of Venezuelan migrants into the national territory. I will aim to 
illustrate a) the typical path migrants face; b) the infrastructure and process that the 
federal government has developed in collaboration with the civil society and international 
organizations to create an official channel of movement; and c) the ways in which 
migrants and the local community have developed their own infrastructure and practices 
to support alternative forms of movement across the border and into Roraima.  
3) Document the challenges that migrants face when navigating through this multifaceted 
mobility regime. I will use specific examples, including deportations of migrants, 
closures of the border, and xenophobic attacks, to underscore how even supposedly 
frictionless spaces experience immobility and violent mobilities.  
4) Reflect on efforts by the Brazilian government to channel these flows outside of Roraima. 
I will focus specifically on the country’s interiorization program, which aims to relocate 
migrants from Roraima to other regions of the country on a voluntary basis. In doing so, I 
will raise critical questions about the limitations of mobility as a form of liberation.   
In addressing these questions, I will predominantly focus on terrestrial border crossings in 
Roraima, although Venezuelan migration in Brazil does occur by air as well. As well, when 
discussing this migration, I will focus specifically on the period from 2015 to 2020 (prior to the 
onset of the COVID-19 pandemic).  
 
Methodology 
 In order to address all of these questions, I used a mixed-methods approach that best 
provided me with ‘on-the-ground’ insight to understand the inner workings of the migratory 
7 
processes. Firstly, I conducted an extensive review of secondary research on the topic. I used 
reports produced by the Brazilian government (e.g., from the Federal Police’s Emergency 
Assistance Committee, set up to monitor the management of the resettlement), Brazilian 
academics and civil society organizations, and international organizations monitoring the 
response. This review served at the basis for addressing Objective 1 and provided a wide variety 
of insights and graphics for the remaining Objectives.  
 Secondly, I conducted a systematic media analysis of Brazilian and Venezuelan news 
sources. Using Google News (setting the language and country settings to Portuguese-Brazil and 
Spanish-Venezuela), I conducted a series of searches using the following terms (in Spanish and 
Portuguese): 
migrant, Venezuelan(s), migration, Roraima, Boa Vista, Pacaraima, border, refugee, 
Venezuela, interiorization, Santa Elena de Uairén, indigenous, xenophobia, Operation 
Acolhida 
I limited the search results to show only those articles written between January 1, 2015 to March 
1, 2020. Also, I limited the results to a specific series of outlets: Folha de São Paulo, O Globo, 
BBC Brasil, Folha de Boa Vista, BBC Mundo, El Universal, and Reuters. Doing so yielded a 
more manageable sample of articles, while also including both national and regional coverage in 
both Venezuela and Brazil. The coverage was much more extensive among Brazilian outlets, in 
comparison to Venezuelan outlets. Whereas the Venezuelan sources I found predominantly 
consisted of cut-and-dry news stories, the Brazilian sources contained a wide diversity of feature, 
news, and investigative pieces. Within this Brazilian subset, the local sources (such as Folha de 
Boa Vista) contained more of the didactic news pieces, whereas the national sources presented 
more investigative and feature pieces. From these initial searches, I obtained a sample of just 
8 
over 100 articles, after which I continued to narrow the sample to roughly 50 articles that were 
directly related to my objectives. This sample then allowed me to respond to a variety of 
questions related to Objectives 2, 3, and 4, including detailed descriptions of local happenings 
and conditions and the prominent discourses surrounding these events. 
 Furthermore, I initially had intended to conduct ethnographic fieldwork, both with 
individuals involved in the response to the influx of migrants (e.g., people working in the civil 
society or international organizations) and migrants themselves. Due to the COVID-19 
pandemic, I planned on conducting interviews virtually. I was fortunate to receive an 
Undergraduate Research Scholarship for the spring of 2021 from the College of Arts and 
Sciences offset the costs of my education and allow me to dedicate more time to this thesis. 
However, despite having several contacts working in the field of migration in Brazil, I 
experienced additional difficulties establishing contact with potential leads. After I reached out, 
most potential participants either did not respond or expressed initial interest and then stopped 
responding. I believe this is because, in addition to the fact that the pandemic deeply complicated 
the field of migration, people are experiencing Zoom/virtual burnout in general. In the end, I 
conducted two interviews, one with a representative from an international organization 
coordinating the response who has had experience in Roraima and at the national headquarters 
and another with an individual working at a nonprofit that supports migrants in Roraima and São 
Paulo. I was hoping that these would lead to further interviews as a snowball strategy, but the 
contact unfortunately ended after the first interview. For the purposes of my project, I only ended 
up including some information presented by the first interview, considering much of the content 
of the second fell outside of the scope. Nonetheless, many of the news articles I reviewed 
9 
fortunately provided a more ethnographic perspective on the issues that compensated for the lack 
of fieldwork.   
 Finally, in order to best apply this methodology to my research questions, I relied on my 
own relevant experiences, skills, and education. Firstly, I am majoring in Spanish, which I have 
studied for a total of eight years now, and minoring in Portuguese, which I have studied for a 
total of three years now. Being fluent in both of these languages was crucial to navigate the 
sources that I used, as few of them were in English. Beyond my knowledge of the languages, my 
coursework in Spanish and Portuguese has given me broad exposure to issues related to politics 
and migration throughout Latin America. Most importantly, my coursework in the Portuguese 
department has provided me with a thorough understanding of the modern sociopolitical history 
and geography of Brazil. Moreover, through Ohio State, I have had the opportunity to go to 
Brazil on three different occasions, one of which was an immersion experience. In fact, the idea 
for this project emerged while I was studying abroad in the South of Brazil (in the city of 
Florianópolis) and I met a Venezuelan migrant who had made the nearly 5,000-kilometer journey 
from the border to Florianópolis by land. I was shocked to learn about the paths that Venezuelan 
migrants took to leave the border region, leading me to question more about the state of Roraima 
itself and Venezuelan mobility throughout the country. On a personal level, the Venezuelan 
diaspora has been of great interest to me for several years now, as my best friend from high 
school immigrated to the U.S. from Venezuela in the early 2000s and introduced me to the study 
of Spanish and the current Venezuelan crisis.  
10 
The intersection of new mobilities scholarship and migration studies: a 
theoretical approach 
 In order to frame my research approach, I primarily engage with a new literature within 
geography (and the social sciences as a whole) known as new mobilities scholarship. Prior to the 
emergence of this literature, the social sciences field was dominated by a deeply a-mobile 
perspective, which often treated places as constituted by sedentarism, and failed to recognize the 
ways in which the mobilities of people, non-human agents, and resources produced these places. 
As such, one of its foremost priorities it to denaturalize these theories of sedentarism, which 
“[treat] as normal stability, meaning, and place, and treats as abnormal distance, change, and 
placelessness.”8 In doing so, new mobilities scholars emphasize the ways in which all places are 
connected to some extent and cannot be viewed as “islands.”9 At the same time, however, new 
mobilities scholars reject theoretical approaches that focus on “postnational deterritorialization 
processes and the end of states as containers for societies.”10 This rejection is notable for two key 
reasons. Firstly, it recognizes the seemingly paradoxical processes that often occur in the modern 
world by which the “quickening of liquidity” in some spaces or for some individuals is 
accompanied by “disconnection, social exclusion, and inaudibility” for others.11 In other words, 
new mobilities literature does not focus exclusively on mobility at the expense of moorings and 
immobility; rather, it works to understand how the two are deeply interrelated. Secondly, this 
approach departs from the common tendency to romanticize mobility as a form of liberation 
from space and place. Rather than fetishizing mobility, it aims to understand the conditions that 
 
8 Sheller, Mimi, and John Urry. “The New Mobilities Paradigm.” Environment and Planning A 38 (February 2006): 
208. https://doi.org/10.1068/a37268.  
9 Ibid., p. 209  
10 Ibid., p.210 
11 Ibid. 
11 
facilitate (some types of) mobility. In sum, new mobilities scholars view mobility as a reflection 
of power because “mobility is a resource to which not everyone has an equal relationship.”12  
 One of the key insights that has been proposed in new mobilities literature that will serve 
as the basis for much of my argument is the dialectical relationship between processes of 
reterritorialization and deterritorialization. When applying these insights about sedentarism and 
liquid modernity to the concept of the nation, new mobilities scholars conceive of mobility as 
pertaining to a process of deterritorialization, while moorings pertain to the realm of 
reterritorialization. Rather than claiming that one has come to dominate the other in the modern 
world, they argue that “the forms of detachment or ‘deterritorialization’ associated with ‘liquid 
modernity’ […] are always accompanied by rhizomic attachments and reterritorializations of 
various kinds.”13 In doing so, they reject an understanding of national territories as simple 
containers in favor of “complex, polymorphic, and multiscalar regulatory geographies”, which 
allow for processes of migration to be understood as localization productions of specific 
practices.14   
 Indeed, by applying new mobilities scholarship to the field of migration studies, scholars 
have been able to connect these processes of mobility, migration, and territoriality. Traditionally, 
many migration scholars have seen migration as a “linear relocation”, where the movement is 
simply from point A to point B and the variable of interest is the process of integration in the 
destination country.15 More recently, however, the trajectory itself is gaining popularity as the 
unit of analysis, which has led to the development of the concept of mobility regimes. Mobility 
 
12 Sheller, Mimi, and John Urry. “The New Mobilities Paradigm.” Environment and Planning A 38 (February 2006): 
211. https://doi.org/10.1068/a37268.  
13 Hannam, Kevin, Mimi Sheller, and John Urry. “Editorial: Mobilities, Immobilities and Moorings.” Mobilities 1, 
no. 1 (2006): 3. https://doi.org/10.1080/17450100500489189.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Schwarz, Inga. “Migrants Moving through Mobility Regimes: The Trajectory Approach as a Tool to Reveal 
Migratory Processes.” Geoforum 116 (2020): 218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.03.007. 
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regimes are defined as systems “that normalize the movements of some travelers while 
criminalizing and entrapping the ventures of others”, thus representing not only the nation-state 
apparatus, but also international organizations, civil society, and local practices.16 In this way, 
mobility regimes help to bring mobility studies into dialogue with migration studies. Most 
relevant to my argument, mobility regimes are understood as complex geographical processes 
which delocalize borders. That is to say, borders do not exist in one simple place (as defined by 
the nation-state), but rather “[materialize] through border practices that are geographically 
scattered and in many cases invisible.”17 In this sense, I will treat the previously described 
dialectic between deterritorialization and reterritorialization as a process of negotiating these 
border practices at different sites in different moments.   
 Additionally, towards the end of my argument, I will bring this literature into 
conversation with theories of topology and topography to understand the relationship between 
mobility and the localities of origin and destination. Whereas topography aims to parse the world 
into static and discrete containers, topology departs from this absolute view to propose a 
relational conception of space in constant transformation. As Lash theorizes, “Topographical 
objects are located in, move in (topographical) space. Topological objects are not located in 
space at all. […] They are instead spaces of movement.”18 New mobilities scholars have made 
similar claims, rejecting sedentarist ontologies of localities in favor of understanding places as 
constituted by mobility. In other words, places cannot be “fixed, given, and separate from those 
 
16 Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. “Methodological Nationalism and beyond: Nation-State Building, 
Migration and the Social Sciences.” Global Networks 2, no. 4 (2002): 189. https://doi.org/10.1111/1471-
0374.00043.  
17 Schwarz, Inga. “Migrants Moving through Mobility Regimes: The Trajectory Approach as a Tool to Reveal 
Migratory Processes.” Geoforum 116 (2020): 219. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.03.007.  
18 Lash, Scott. “Deforming the Figure: Topology and the Social Imaginary.” Theory, Culture & Society 29, no. 4-5 
(2012): 265. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276412448829. 
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visiting.”19 Thus, introducing literature on topology and topography will allow me to expand on 
this paradigm shift in more explicit and well-defined terms.  
 Finally, in order to frame and guide the elements of Venezuelan mobility in Brazil that I 
will analyze, I will refer to Cresswell’s elements of politics of mobility and his concept of 
constellations of mobility.20 Cresswell defines a constellation of mobility as a “particular 
[pattern] of movement, representations of movement, and ways of practicing movement that 
make sense together.”21 In other words, looking at mobility as a constellation helps to highlight 
the ways in which mobility does not just consist of movement, but it also is a discursively 
produced representation and an embodied and practiced experience. Furthermore, he delineates 
the following elements to highlight the relationship between constellations of mobility and 
power22: 
• Motive force: what drives a person or thing to move? 
• Velocity: how fast does a person or thing move? 
• Rhythm: how is a ‘normal’ social order produced through constant rhythms in which a 
person or thing moves? 
• Route: what path does the movement take? 
• Experience: how is the movement felt as an embodied experience? 
• Friction: when and how does the movement stop? 
 
19 Sheller, Mimi, and John Urry. “The New Mobilities Paradigm.” Environment and Planning A 38 (February 2006): 
214. https://doi.org/10.1068/a37268.  
20 Cresswell, Tim. “Towards a politics of mobility.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28 (February 
2010): 17–31. https://doi.org/10.1068/d11407.  
21 Ibid., p. 18 
22 Ibid. 
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Throughout different sections of this work, I will explore these questions to ensure that I paint a 
comprehensive picture of the mobility regime in Brazil and the politics of this regime.  
 
Structure of the thesis 
 I have divided the body of this work into four main chapters. In Chapter II, I describe the 
colonial and geopolitical forms of mobility that have historically existed throughout the state of 
Roraima, in order to set the stage for the current changes in mobility in the region. In Chapter III, 
I present a thorough overview of the characteristics of the recent influx and emphasize the 
relatively frictionless path these migrants face, given both the coordinated response from the 
federal government and the more local, quotidian reality of the porous border. In Chapter IV, I 
will qualify this notion of a seemingly deterritorialized zone by describing several different 
specific examples of how agents within Roraima, including the local government, police forces, 
and local residents, have challenged this mobility and worked to reinforce boundaries between 
the two countries. In Chapter V, I will analyze the interiorization program, which aims to 
relocate migrants living in Roraima to other regions of the country, both in terms of what it 
means for those migrants who choose to participate and the state of Roraima itself. Finally, in 
Chapter VI, I will offer my final considerations on the empirical, methodological, and theoretical 
contributions of this work. 
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Chapter II: Geopolitical and colonial mobility in Roraima over time 
 
In order to better understand the current influx of Venezuelan migrants into the state of Roraima, 
it is critical to understand the historical construction of mobility throughout the region. Doing so 
indicates that, contrary to popular belief, Roraima has never been a sedentary region that has 
only recently been overwhelmed by movement. As the new mobilities scholars emphasize, “all 
places are tied into at least thin networks of connections that stretch beyond each such place and 
mean that nowhere can be an ‘island.’”23 In this section, I will emphasize how the history of 
mobility throughout Roraima has been deeply intertwined with both the geopolitics of the border 
and the settler colonial impetus to occupy indigenous land. In addition to confirming the claims 
of the new mobilities scholars, mapping this history will set the stage for more appropriately 
understanding the way that mobility operates in the region today with the intensified influx of 
Venezuelan migrants.  
 The mobility regime near the border has historically focused on encouraging and 
enabling movement from other regions and even other countries in favor of colonial occupation 
and development of the Amazon region. Although the first records of Portuguese colonial 
contact with indigenous lands and communities in what is today the state of Roraima occurred 
with the invasion of Pedro Teixeira in 1639, the area did not become a site of extensive colonial 
occupation until the twentieth century. Specifically, the turn of the century saw an influx of 
migrants from several regions of the country in search of economic gains from rubber production 
and cattle raising within the Amazon. As these activities began to decline partway through the 
 
23 Sheller, Mimi, and John Urry. “The New Mobilities Paradigm.” Environment and Planning A 38 (February 2006): 
207–26. https://doi.org/10.1068/a37268.  
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1910s, many were attracted to the region surrounding the Rio Branco (see Figure 2) due to its 
gold and diamond mines, consequently leading to a surge in garimpo (small-scale, often informal  
Figure 2: Map of the principal rivers flowing through the state of Roraima24 
 
mining activities often focused on gold in the Amazon) that reached nearly 60% of the region’s 
economic activity by the early 1940s.25 In this case (as in future cases), the existence of 
 
24 “BR-174.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, March 13, 2021. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BR-174.  
25
 Silveira, Isolda Maciel da, and Marcelo Gatti. “Notas Sobre a Ocupação De Roraima, Migração e Colonização.” 
Boletim do Museu Paraense Emilio Goeldi, Série Antropologia 4, no. 1 (1988): 43–64. https://repositorio.museu-
goeldi.br/handle/mgoeldi/467.  
17 
economic opportunities without the corresponding infrastructure to support mobility beyond 
these specific sites made migration unsustainable. In the face of such failed colonization 
attempts, the fact that migrants resettled in the banks of the Rio Branco underscore the value of 
having access to channels of connection with other regions.  
It was not until the midcentury, however, that sponsoring colonial mobility became a 
prominent component of the state’s territoriality project. In 1943, President Getúlio Vargas 
established five Federal Territories throughout the border zones in the Amazon, including one in 
the Rio Branco region (which would later come to be renamed Roraima). According to Vargas, 
the establishment of these federal units represented the need to “occupy the empty spaces of the 
national territory”, especially in the context of World War II. It is critical to note here the way in 
which the case for mobility is built upon the negation of the existence of indigenous 
communities. In order to buttress this strategy, the state began to exercise a greater 
administrative and military presence in this region.26 In addition to the Federal Territories, the 
government established several agricultural colonies through the 1940s, providing families with 
transport, economic support, and tools (among other items) to channel them into the region. In 
fact, the Coronel Mota Colony, founded in 1953, specifically aimed to attract Japanese 
immigrants interested in farming the land. However, by the 1960s, many families had abandoned 
the colonies because of their limited accessibility to surrounding areas.27 In this sense, the lack of 
further mechanisms and infrastructure to support local movement (and by extension access to 
 
26
 Barbosa da Silva, Altiva. “Geopolítica Na Fronteira Norte Do Brasil: o Papel Das Forças Armadas Nas 
Transformações Sócio-Espaciais Do Estado De Roraima,” 2007. https://teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8136/tde-
28052010-102349/pt-br.php.  
27
 Silveira, Isolda Maciel da, and Marcelo Gatti. “Notas Sobre a Ocupação De Roraima, Migração e Colonização.” 
Boletim do Museu Paraense Emilio Goeldi, Série Antropologia 4, no. 1 (1988): 43–64. https://repositorio.museu-
goeldi.br/handle/mgoeldi/467.  
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resources) made this mobility project unsustainable. Once again, as settlers abandoned the 
colonies, settlements along the Rio Branco expanded due to the accessibility the river provided 
to other regions.28 
The emergence of the military dictatorship in 1964 marked a shift in the state strategy, as 
the government invested in a more aggressive mobility regime that would buttress its economic 
and geopolitical project. The rise of the dictatorship came within the context of the Cold War, at 
a time when Roraima became an increasingly critical location in ‘protecting’ the country from 
the spread of communism. In addition to Guyana gaining independence from England in 1966 
and nationalizing its main sectors two years later, Venezuela was experiencing an unstable 
political moment in the wake of the Cuban Revolution.29 In response to these growing 
geopolitical concerns, the regime was notably more aggressive in reviving the seemingly failed 
colonial projects of the previous decades, offering plots of land and financial incentives to those 
interested in settling in the region.30 Such efforts helped support wide expansion of garimpo 
activities in the region, with estimates placing the number of garimpeiro (people who participate 
in garimpo) migrants around 40,000. In addition, these ideological concerns also led to increased 
military presence in Roraima with the aim of securing the border.31 However, as aforementioned, 
 
28 Silveira, Isolda Maciel da, and Marcelo Gatti. “Notas Sobre a Ocupação De Roraima, Migração e Colonização.” 
Boletim do Museu Paraense Emilio Goeldi, Série Antropologia 4, no. 1 (1988): 43–64. https://repositorio.museu-
goeldi.br/handle/mgoeldi/467. 
29 Barbosa da Silva, Altiva. “Geopolítica Na Fronteira Norte Do Brasil: o Papel Das Forças Armadas Nas 
Transformações Sócio-Espaciais Do Estado De Roraima,” 2007. https://teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8136/tde-
28052010-102349/pt-br.php. 
30
 Da Silva Oliveira, Rafael. “As Transformações Na Organização Espacial Do Estado De Roraima: Uma Conversa 
Inicial a Partir Da BR-174.” Revista Acta Geográfica 1 (2007): 45–65. 
https://doi.org/10.5654/actageo2007.0101.0003.  
31
 Barbosa da Silva, Altiva. “Geopolítica Na Fronteira Norte Do Brasil: o Papel Das Forças Armadas Nas 
Transformações Sócio-Espaciais Do Estado De Roraima,” 2007. https://teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8136/tde-
28052010-102349/pt-br.php. 
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the continuity of these colonial projects could not rely on economic or even security incentives 
alone.  
In order to increase the velocity of this movement (or perhaps to reduce the concomitant 
ecological friction), the dictatorship materialized its mobility regime by expanding local 
infrastructure, despite the immobilizations that such moorings created. Beyond just ‘occupying’ 
the spaces in Roraima, the dictatorship had the explicit goal of connecting this region to the more 
populous southern regions of the country.32 As such, in addition to sponsoring colonization 
projects, they invested in road and highway projects. Most notably, this period witnessed the 
extension of the BR-174 highway from Manaus (AM) through Boa Vista, representing an 
additional stretch of 971 kilometers cleared (though unpaved) by 1977.33 From 1980 to 1991, the 
annual rate of population growth reached 9.6%, the highest level for the country, which as a 
whole was growing at a rate of 1.89%.34 It is critical to note that, while this action was able to 
channel a wave of mobility into the state in search of gold and other metals, the channel itself 
entailed the immobilization and displacement of indigenous communities in the region to more 
remote areas. Not only did the road cut directly through lands inhabited by the Yanomami 
communities of Waimiri-Atroari and Wai-Wai, but the concomitant settlements of garimpeiros 
along the road led to intense deforestation of the region. Ironically, prior to the construction of 
the road, the government established reservations for these same communities in areas that it 
 
32 Barbosa da Silva, Altiva. “Geopolítica Na Fronteira Norte Do Brasil: o Papel Das Forças Armadas Nas 
Transformações Sócio-Espaciais Do Estado De Roraima,” 2007. https://teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8136/tde-
28052010-102349/pt-br.php. 
33 Da Silva Oliveira, Rafael. “As Transformações Na Organização Espacial Do Estado De Roraima: Uma Conversa 
Inicial a Partir Da BR-174.” Revista Acta Geográfica 1 (2007): 45–65. 
https://doi.org/10.5654/actageo2007.0101.0003. 
34 Crocia de Barros, Nilson. “Mobilidade Populacional Ocupacional, Fronteira e Dinâmica Das  Paisagens Na 
Amazônia: o Caso De Roraima, Brasil.” Cadernos de Estudos Sociais 12, no. 2  (1996): 237–84. 
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would inevitably divide with the BR-174.35 As a result of these ensuing colonial conflicts, the 
Waimiri-Atroari population dropped from 3,000 in 1968 to 350 in 1983.36 In this sense, it 
becomes clear that mobility, though expanded under the military dictatorship, is a differentially 
accessible resource, as the regime consists of several overlapping systems “that normalize the 
movements of some travelers while criminalising and entrapping the ventures of others.”37 
 Critically, though, despite the durability of the mobility regime’s infrastructure, it is 
constantly renegotiated. For instance, almost immediately following the opening of the BR-174 
segment connecting the south to Roraima, a regular bus route was created between Manaus and 
Boa Vista to further mobilize settlement of the region. However, the indigenous resistance within 
local communities did not only lead to their displacement and death, but also helped to shut 
down vehicular traffic along the stretches of the highway that pass through Waimiri-Atroari 
territory every day from 6:00 PM to 6 AM. Nonetheless, the Manaus-Boa Vista bus line was 
exempt from this rule.38 Thus, the state had to strike a balance between the mobility required for 
its own colonial occupation project and the mobility of indigenous communities, demonstrating 
the ways in which the mobility of some often implies the immobility of others. Furthermore, this 
case highlights the disparities between representations and practices of mobility. Although the 
limitations to the road traffic are heralded as signs of compromise with indigenous communities, 
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the embodied reality of these rules is likely very immobile, as the rule excuses one of the key 
channels of colonial movement.  
The retreat of the military dictatorship in 1985 led to a period of transition that resulted in 
the administrative and structural condition that the state of Roraima largely finds itself in today. 
Firstly, the democratization of the country, including the passage of a new constitution in 1988, 
triggered a fragmented process of municipal emancipation, meaning that the former Federal 
Territories would no longer operate under the federal government and that the former colonial 
settlements around the BR-174 would become municipalities. However, these municipalities had 
no conditions to successfully manage this emancipation, leading in part to the current “abrupt 
chasm” that has come to exist between the capital city of Boa Vista and the remaining 
municipalities in Roraima.39 In addition, the administrations of the early 1990s focused on 
targeting and eradicating the extensive garimpo of the previous decades, especially in 
preparation for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio-92). As a 
result, many garimpeiros and agricultural settlers in Roraima migrated to Venezuela, after which 
some also preceded to Guyana and Suriname in search of other garimpos. Beyond being one of 
the first moments of extensive colonial mobility across the border, this movement once again 
triggered a series of conflicts and massacres of indigenous peoples.40  
Despite the decline in these agricultural and mining colonial projects, the democratization 
period marked a shift from treating Roraima as a boundary, characterized by division, towards 
treating it as a border, characterized by international connection and traffic. In the midst of 
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migration out of the state, the governments of Itamar Franco (1992-1994) in Brazil and Rafael 
Caldera (1994-1998) in Venezuela developed a stronger diplomatic relationship and agenda, 
articulated through the Protocolo de La Guzmania. In addition to paving and connecting the BR-
174 with the Troncal 10, the Venezuelan side of the highway, the protocol also connected Boa 
Vista to the Bajo Caroní hydroelectric plants in Venezuela with Boa Vista.41 As such, Roraima is 
the only state in Brazil not connected to the national electricity grid, primarily dependent on 
Venezuela to supply its energy.42 These actions, however, once again reinforce the colonial 
forms of connection and occupation in the region, as attempts to lay the power line from the Guri 
dam to Boa Vista led to protests from and conflicts with indigenous communities along the 
border.43 Nonetheless, the governments were able to successfully lay the lines in 200144, and the 
positive relationship between the two countries continued through the 2000s, as Presidents Hugo 
Chávez of Venezuela and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil expanded commercial exchange at 
a national level.45 In fact, at one point, Chávez affirmed that Venezuela could act as the main 
supplier of gas and diesel for the state energy company in Roraima and argued in favor of 
keeping the border open at all times, though neither of these ended up materializing.46  
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As signs of economic trouble began to manifest in Venezuela prior to the onset of the 
current crisis, ranging roughly from 2005 to 2015, the border became a place of extensive 
informal and reciprocal commerce. Venezuelans would cross the border to buy food, medicine, 
and other products that were unavailable or too expensive in Venezuela, while Brazilians would 
cross to buy the extremely cheap gasoline its neighboring country had to offer. While the latter 
was once the main form of mobility in the region, the former has expressively emerged as the 
dominant movement along the border since the onset of the crisis in the mid-2010s.47  
 Although many of the specific details I have included in this chapter may appear 
superfluous to comprehending the current migratory patterns between the two countries, I want 
to underscore that Roraima and Venezuela have constituted one another in terms of mobility and 
immobility for decades now. The mere existence of connections and movement through and 
between these regions is not novel. Specifically, the informal border exchanges that I just 
described are critical to understanding the changes in this dynamic that I will describe in 
subsequent chapters. Additionally, this history underscores the ways in which migration itself 
often occurs in relation to questions of mobility, as the colonial settlers often abandoned certain 
areas in favor of others with channels of mobility. Finally, the colonial history of all of these 
historical occurrences, which often entail the displacing and genocide of indigenous 
communities, illustrates how mobility has different implications for different groups. 
Historicizing these forms of structural violence will then provide more context and clarity for the 
indigenous-focused questions I will address in subsequent chapters.  
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Chapter III: Roraima as a deterritorialized zone of migration  
 
 In this chapter, I will expand on the ways in which the Brazilian mobility regime in the 
state of Roraima has largely enabled and worked to facilitate mobility of Venezuelan migrants 
into the national territory over the past several years. First, I will explore the motive forces that 
have triggered this influx of migrants over the past five years. In doing so, I will highlight the 
ways in which this mobility is not necessarily new to the region, but rather has experienced a 
unidirectional intensification in recent years. Secondly, I will describe issues related to the 
velocity and routes of these flows in order to understand the actions taken by the Brazilian state 
and other agents in the mobility regime to facilitate these flows. Beyond giving a high-level 
overview of the coordinated response to the influx, exploring these issues will demonstrate the 
ways in which the border itself has become a relatively deterritorialized zone, characterized as an 
area of widely unrestricted and frictionless mobility. However, given the dialectical relationship 
between deterritorialization and reterritorialization, this sets the stage for reterritorializing border 
practices to sprout up in other localities and by other, supra-national agents (which I will detail in 
Section IV). Finally, by exploring the rhythms and routes of these flows, I will reaffirm the new 
mobilities scholars’ understanding of migration as a non-linear trajectory that adapts to the 
migrant’s needs and the mobility regime.  
 
From Venezuela to Brazil 
 To begin, it is crucial to highlight the factors that have contributed to the mass exodus of 
Venezuelans throughout the region, in order to understand the modalities of and responses to this 
movement. The evolution of the crisis is incredibly complicated, as it has resulted from the 
25 
intersection of several distinct, but interrelated factors, including “political turmoil, socio-
economic instability and [an] ongoing humanitarian crisis.”48 Although migrants have been 
emigrating from Venezuela since the early 2000s during the Chávez administration, Venezuelans 
began to feel the exacerbation of the crisis in a more generalized sense beginning in 2015 during 
the subsequent Maduro administration. First of all, it was around this time that the economy 
began to plummet, as hyperinflation of the bolivar (the national currency) made it increasingly 
difficult to afford necessities. For instance, according to the Café con Leche Index developed by 
Bloomberg49, the cost of a cup of coffee was 1,800 times as high in January 2019 as January of 
the previous year.50 Grocery stores, as well, often lack sufficient stocks of food and products, 
leading 8 out of 10 Venezuelans to have to reduce their food intake in some capacity.51 Secondly, 
public and social services throughout the country have fallen into an incredibly precarious state. 
One study found that 78 percent of hospitals reported shortages of medicine52, and people who 
require operations often must purchase their own medical supplies, in addition to the already 
inflated healthcare costs.53 Similarly, access to electricity is unstable, as both outages and power 
surges have become more common.54 Finally, in addition to increased levels of violence born out 
of this desperation55, political persecution and violence has grown since 2016, following protests 
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against a series of actions taken by the Maduro administration to consolidate their power.56 
Specifically, the government began ordering violent repression of street protests, imprisoning 
political opponents, prosecuting civilians in military courts, and harassing human rights 
defenders.57 Although these factors do not always qualify Venezuelan migrants for refugee status 
based on national or international definitions, the political, economic, and humanitarian collapse 
of the country does indeed qualify the subsequent exodus as a “forced migration.”58 
 In fact, the flight of Venezuelans, predominantly within Latin America, has come to 
represent one of the largest instances of forced migration in the past several years, being second 
only to the Syrian refugee crisis.59 Figure 3 displays the stock of migrants throughout the region 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Venezuelan migrants throughout Latin America60 
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world at just underneath 5 million, with 4 million of these estimated to be living within the Latin 
America and the Caribbean.61 As seen in the figure, the greatest numbers of migrants have fled to 
neighboring Spanish-speaking country, including Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile. Although 
Brazil initially was not the preferred destination for most Venezuelans, likely due to linguistic 
differences and the lack of economic prospects in Roraima, it has come to receive the fifth 
largest contingent of migrants over the past several years.62 In addition to the fact that Brazil has 
greatly facilitated Venezuelan access to the national territory and social services (which I will 
discuss later), it also represents one of the few viable options available to migrants with limited 
resources to go further than a neighboring country.63  
 
The logistics of crossing 
 The journey into Brazil is oftentimes a rigorous and draining experience. Given the 
socioeconomic nature of the factors pushing many migrants to flee Venezuela and seek refuge or 
residency in Brazil, the majority of crossings occur by land at the border.64 The only legal point 
of entry along the border between Venezuela and Brazil is located in the municipality of 
Pacaraima, in the northernmost state of Roraima, as depicted in Figure 4.65 In order to make the 
journey to Brazil, migrants must first arrive in the Venezuelan state of Bolívar, the  
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Figure 4: Main cities along the Venezuela-Brazil Border66 
 
southeastern state that borders Brazil. In order to reach this rather remote region of the country, 
the trajectory for migrants coming from other regions is often rather improvised and haphazard, 
consisting of primarily of hitchhiking and finding inexpensive bus passes.67 Once they reach 
Santa Elena de Uairén, the border city on the Venezuelan side, they must precede about 20 
kilometers along the Troncal 10/BR-174  to reach the official post of entry in Pacaraima.68 
Migrants are able to do so both by car (oftentimes paying someone to give them a ride), by bus, 
or by foot. Oftentimes, the bus or car services drop them off right at the border, choosing not to 
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cross unless the migrants are willing to pay extra. 69 The border itself does not consist of any 
major infrastructure, but rather migrants are able to freely cross and continue along the BR-174 
until arriving at a border crossing outpost set up by the Federal Police. From there, depending on 
the migrant’s purpose for entering the country, they may be directed to the federal government’s 
border infrastructure for processing or may continue their journey along the BR-174. Figure 5 
maps the procession from the border, marked by the “Marco BV-8”, until the government’s post 
of entry, labeled “Pacaraima border crossing station.” Figure 6 shows what this looks like in 
actuality. I will go into more detail concerning the government’s processing of migrants at the  
Figure 5: Map of the official path to enter Pacaraima from Venezuela70 
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Figure 6: Image of the official path to enter Pacaraima from Venezuela71 
 
border in the next section. For many migrants, however, Pacaraima is not the final destination on 
their route, as the capital city of Boa Vista offers greater potential, capacity, and access to other 
regions.  
 Migrants subsequently must continue along the BR-174, often facing hunger, thirst, and 
exhaustion because of the lack of services and infrastructure along the path, as they aim to reach 
Boa Vista. The journey from Pacaraima to Boa Vista, pictured in Figure 7, is approximately 216 
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Figure 7: Map of the segment of the BR-174 running through Roraima72 
 
Pacaraima. Although a bus service operates regularly between the two cities, the passes (often 
costing between R$30 and R$50) are too expensive for many migrants, leading them once again 
to find alternative means of transportation, whether walking, finding a car, or some combination 
of these. Many do not realize the length of the journey. For those who receive some type of 
assistance along the way, they can get there in two or three days. For those who have to walk the 
entire distance day and night, it takes four or five days. For those who only walk during the day, 
it can take up to 10 days.73 Figure 8 displays an example of what this journey may entail. For  
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Figure 8: Map of the route migrants take from the border to Boa Vista74 
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many, their journey ends upon arriving at the aptly named Praça Simón Bolívar on Avenida 
Venezuela, where they often agglomerate while waiting to begin their legal regularization or 
receive medical treatment or other humanitarian services.75 Migrants, however, are not alone in 
this journey, as several agents from different sectors of society have mobilized to respond to and 
support the recent influx of Venezuelans into the country. In the next two sections, I will further 
explore the ways the mobility regime influences these routes.  
 
Operação Acolhida: designations of official channels of mobility  
The response of the federal government of Brazil has constituted one of the most salient 
elements of the mobility regime that operates at the border with Venezuela. In February of 2018, 
by means of Provisional Measure N. 820, the federal government announced the birth of 
Operação Acolhida (Operation Welcome), a task force charged with responding to the influx of 
migrants, and its concomitant Federal Committee of Emergency Assistance. The operation aims 
to integrate Venezuelan migrants and refugees into Brazilian society and reestablish the welfare 
and security of the state of Roraima. Although the task force is officially led by the Casa Civil 
(the office of the presidency), it relies on the participation of 10 federal ministries, the 
coordination of the armed forces, and the cooperation of more than 100 civils society and 
international organizations, such as the IOM and UNHCR.76 In fact, Brazil’s response has been 
considered one of the best in the region due to this “synergy of efforts that unite agencies from 
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the United Nations, Brazilian army, civil society, and governments.”77 Operação Acolhida 
focuses its efforts into three main phases: reception and border planning, sheltering, and 
interiorization.  
As indicated by the new mobilities scholars, because mobility is always located and 
materialized, these efforts have entailed changes to the materiality of the border region, with the 
construction of infrastructure to facilitate this movement, while also designating appropriate and 
legal forms of mobility. As previously described, the main and official pathway connecting 
Venezuela and Brazil is the BR-174/Troncal 10, where key federal agents including the Federal 
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Figure 9: Diagram of the government infrastructure on the Brazilian side of the border78 
 
the first point of contact that migrants face upon entering the country via this route is the 
Reception and Identification Post (Posto de Recepção e Identificação, in the figure), the name 
for the previously mentioned border crossing station operated by the Federal Police. In this post, 
migrants are able to fill out entrance permits (if they do not have a valid passport), pass through 
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migration control with the Federal Police, and receive vaccinations.79 Then, migrants are able to 
proceed to the Screening Post (Triagem, in the figure), where they receive an orientation 
concerning the different migratory statuses, submit documentation and requests to the Federal 
Police, and receive a CPF (a Brazilian form of identification) and work permits. Finally, those 
with documentation still being processed or in vulnerable situations are able to seek help and 
medical treatment in the Social Care Post (PAA, in the figure) and can stay in the BV-8 shelter 
(Abrigo, in the figure) located in Pacaraima.80. This shelter, however, is destined for those 
migrants who are unable to make the journey to Boa Vista or are in particularly vulnerable 
conditions, and is meant to be a transitory option, as it often limits migrants to stays of less than 
three months.81 Migrants can access all of these same services (e.g., legal documentation and 
access to medical attention) in Boa Vista, which has all of these same posts, but at a greater 
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Figure 10: Flow diagram of government processing of Venezuelan migrants in Pacaraima82 
 
Figure 11: Flow diagram of government processing of Venezuelan migrants in Boa Vista83 
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the military presence at the border (which I will explore further in Section Four), almost all of 
the infrastructure that has been constructed aims to facilitate and expedite flows, without any 
major form of barrier or blockage.  
 
The legalities of crossing 
Beyond the physical infrastructure itself, the legal framework that regularizes these 
migrants has largely aimed to produce a national space characterized by flows, eliminating 
barriers to entrance and integration in social and economic systems. Firstly, according to 
Brazilian Law N. 9,474/97 and its adoption of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, 
Venezuelan migrants have the possibility to seek refuge upon entering the country.84 However, it 
can be difficult to concede refuge to Venezuelans, as these pieces of legislation define refugees 
in political terms as individuals fleeing persecution or threats. For those who have been displaced 
due to economic precarity, the case for refuge under Brazilian law becomes significantly 
weaker.85  Consequently, the Brazilian government passed the Ministerial Ordinance N. 09/2018, 
which offers Venezuelans (and citizens of all other bordering countries) authorization for 
temporary residency, which could potentially transition into permanent residency after its two-
year duration. The resolution extends all the same rights offered to Brazilian citizens to holders 
of this authorization, including access to the public health system and social support programs 
such as Bolsa Familia, for which reason it has come to be referred to as the humanitarian visa.86 
Figure 12 highlights the change in requests for each of these statuses over time. The 
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Figure 12: Comparison in applications for refuge and temporary residency87 
 
humanitarian visa of this type had only been offered once before, for Haitian migrants following 
the earthquake in 2010. Unlike before, however, there is no upper limit to the number of visas 
granted each year, the visa can be requested in Brazil (as opposed to the country of origin), and 
the list of required documents is shorter.88 Of course, the concession of visas and refugee status 
are legal designations that do not necessarily actually facilitate or impede flows themselves 
(though the promise of easy paths to residency could serve as a motive force to migrants); rather, 
they determine the extent to which migrants are subject to the “criminalizing and entrapping” 
functions of the mobility regime.89   
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 Similarly, the federal government and state agents have taken several measures to address 
and resolve issues that have contributed to bottlenecks in the migratory process. In 2018, for 
instance, the state government of Roraima submitted a decree to increase the security and 
inspection conducted at the border and restricting their access to public services by requiring a 
valid passport. The former measure would have created longer wait times for service at the 
border, while the latter would have expelled many migrants from the public services (such as 
medical treatment) at the border, as the majority arrive at the border without documents.90 
Almost immediately, however, the Federal Supreme Court (STF) struck the decree down, as the 
power to regulate border control lies with the federal government.91 Similarly, prior to the 
deployment of Operação Acolhida, the quantity of migrants arriving at the border was well 
beyond their capacity, leading to extremely long wait times at the border and long bureaucratic 
processing times. In response, they not only recruited an impromptu task force of civil society 
volunteers and public servants, but they also began emitting a “juridically questionable” but 
highly efficient system of scheduling refuge requests. As a result, the average time from initial 
service to the submission of refuge requests dropped from six months to fifteen days between 
2016 and 2017.92 Finally, upon recognizing the backlog in asylum cases, (in addition to adding 
the previously described humanitarian visa), the federal government expanded its definition of 
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asylum and began granting refugee status on a prime facie basis in 201993, which removes the 
need to conduct the long and delayed interviews to determine whether the migrant qualified for 
temporary residence or refuge.94 Consequently, whereas the government only granted asylum to 
42 migrants in the first half of 2019, it was able to extend asylum to approximately 26,000 in the 
second half of the year.95 This is not to say that the mobility regime has developed a perfectly 
agile and boundless space of flows. For instance, as the size of the influx increased following the 
creation of Operação Acolhida and the deepening of the crisis in Venezuela, the agility of these 
state-sponsored channels still faces challenges, considering long lines and wait times were once 
again reported at the end of 2019, this time in the Screening Post in Boa Vista.96 However, the 
efforts to combat and reduce these bottlenecks indicates the federal government’s recognition of 
the value of velocity as a resource in processes of mobility. 
 Furthermore, the shifting materiality within the border region to accommodate these 
flows extends well beyond the infrastructure established along the paths these migrants follow 
into the country. Specifically, Operação Acolhida’s second phase, known as ‘sheltering’, 
consists of constructing and operating shelters with the capacity to hold large numbers of 
migrants in the cities of Pacaraima and Boa Vista.97 Although the first refugee shelter had been 
constructed in Pacaraima by the municipal government with the support of NGOs several months 
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prior to the inauguration of Operação Acolhida98, the federal backing provided by the operation 
allowed the total number of shelters to grow to thirteen by 2019, with two in Pacaraima and 
eleven in Boa Vista. The shelter names and capacities can be seen in Figure 13 and the location 
of the shelters throughout each city can be seen circled in red in Figures 14 and 15. While in  
Figure 13: Location, name, and capacity of Operação Acolhida shelters99 
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Boa Vista 
Shelter Name Capacity 
Santa Tereza 600 
Tancredo Neves 300 
Jardim Floresta 600 
Latife Salomão 540 
São Vicente 320 
São Vicente 2 230 
Nova Canaã 380 
Pintolândia (indigenous-specific shelter) 590 
Rondon 1 810 
Rondon 2 600 
Rondon 3 1080 
Pacaraima 
Shelter Name Capacity 
Janokoida (indigenous-specific shelter) 610 
BV8 (transitional shelter) 256 
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Figure 14: Map of the government-run shelters and infrastructure in Pacaraima100 
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Figure 15: Map of the government-run shelters in Boa Vista101 
 
the shelters, they have access to a wide variety of services, including three meals per day, 
hygiene products, Portuguese courses, and telephones to call home, among others. Notably, two 
of the shelters are specifically designated for indigenous communities, with resources and 
procedures tailored to their practices (such as hammocks instead of beds and raw food materials 
rather than prepared meals).  In this way, the sheltering phase of Operação Acolhida highlights 
how infrastructure often accompanies the designation of official flows of movements by the 
mobility regime in order to buttress such flows. Nonetheless, this is not to say that the 
infrastructure is not expansive enough to house and accommodate all of the Venezuelans that 
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find themselves in vulnerable situations in Roraima. For instance, at the end of 2019, the OAS 
found that 2950 migrants were living in ‘spontaneous occupations’, 997 were living in a space 
adjacent to the bus terminal, and 425 were living in the street in Boa Vista. Both the 
establishment of an extensive network of shelters and the occupation of public spaces represent a 
dramatic shift in the constitution of Pacaraima and Boa Vista, as they previously had little 
infrastructure and a small local population. In a more general sense, the transformation of these 
cities—both through the border reception and sheltering phases—highlights the ways in which 
places are constituted by the human mobilities that run through them, thus supporting the new 
mobilities scholars’ rejection of ontologies separating people and places.  
 
The mobility regime beyond the state: diverse modalities of motion  
 Much of the previously described infrastructure aims to channel migrant mobility through 
what I will call the ‘official channel’, involving the parties designated by Operação Acolhida to 
aid in the response. However, the true reality of the mobility that the mobility regime has 
sanctioned throughout this region covers much more than this linear, unidirectional channel 
composed of civil society organizations, international organizations, and the government. 
Despite the intense focus on Operação Acolhida as the primary element of interest when 
discussing Venezuelan migration in Brazil, several other agents participate in and constitute this 
response, thus allowing for additional forms of mobilities beyond this official channel. In this 
section, I will further develop the portrait of Roraima as a deterritorialized zone by illustrating 
how localized practices also perform a specific role within the mobility regime.   
First of all, although the mobility regime has indeed materialized the official channel of 
mobility as previously described, much of the omission of infrastructure constitutes the 
47 
alternatives channel of movement just as much as the infrastructure that has been installed. The 
border itself lacks any significant divisive infrastructure, with white markers that trace the 
territorial bound without actually impeding any traffic, as shown in Figure 16. Although the 
federal government does conduct monitoring of the border, the ecological nature of the border 
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makes this widely ineffective in policing unofficial crossings.103 The border is widely devoid of 
waterways or major natural barriers and, as seen in Figure 17, the landscape surrounding the  
Figure 17: Map of the vegetation along the Venezuela-Brazil border104 
 
Santa Elena de Uairén—Pacaraima crossing point primarily consists of savanna-like grasslands 
and scrub. In theory, the extensive demarcation of indigenous reservations along the border, as 
seen in Figure 18, should ensure more state control and monitoring of the region, as federal law 
requires the government to ensure that these lands are only occupied by indigenous peoples.105 
However, in practice, indigenous communities in these lands are often left to fend for 
themselves. For instance, in 2019 alone, there were 256 registered cases of invasions (often for 
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land grabbing or exploration of natural resources) across 151 indigenous lands throughout the 
country.106 As such, despite being difficult to track, testimonies from local residents indicate the  
Figure 18: Map of demarcated indigenous territories in the state of Roraima107 
 
existence of at least seven points of clandestine crossings into Pacaraima that Venezuelans use to 
buy food and sell gasoline in Brazil. As a result of the growth of these alternative routes, 
motorcyclists are able to navigate through the brush-filled landscape in as fast as 15 minutes. In 
fact, to supplement this informal economy, indigenous communities located on or near the 
border have even begun charging migrants R$20 to indicate the best routes to migrants hoping to 
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embark on an unofficial crossing.108 Moreover, even when crossing through the official channel 
in Pacaraima, migrants are sometimes able to pass through the city without registering with the 
Federal Police. The previously described infrastructure established by the government as a part 
of Operação Acolhida operates much more to route foot traffic to specific areas (such as the 
Triage Post) and does not necessarily act as a blockage to this traffic. As such, migrants who do 
not report to the Federal Police have been able to continue through the city towards Boa Vista, 
without ever being stopped by state agents.109 In this sense, both the lacking state presence and 
ecological nature of the border region contribute to the relatively unrestrictive mobility regime.   
In addition to expediting these relatively linear flows of migrants from Venezuela into 
Brazil’s border cities, the mobility regime in Roraima has also grown to accommodate the non-
linear back-and-forth motions that have been exacerbated with the growth of the crisis in 
Venezuela over the past several years. As previously described, prior to 2015, the border region 
was constituted by a consistent to-and-fro traffic of Brazilians and Venezuelans as they crossed 
the border to buy or sell products at more affordable or more lucrative rates in either country.110 
The relatively stable and predictable nature of these flows thus established the rhythm at the 
border, which has since been disrupted due to the massive unidirectional influx of Venezuelan 
migrants. However, despite there being Venezuelans that choose to leave the country 
indefinitely, there are others that continue to move between Roraima and Venezuela in order to 
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buy products in Brazil that are unavailable in Venezuela.111 In theory, the official channel of 
mobility accounts for these movements. Whereas the humanitarian visa allows migrants to come 
and go from the country, the legal system technically stipulates that asylum seekers inform 
officials when they return to Venezuela through an online portal. In practice, however, the lack 
of true barriers at the border makes it difficult to track these crossings or to enforce the informing 
process among asylum seekers. In fact, nearly all of the sources I reviewed that cited statistics for 
border crossings acknowledged that the figures were likely inaccurate due to the fact that the 
government is often unable to capture when migrants cross the border several times.112 In fact, 
the border has come to present such permeability that it not only enables this back-and-forth 
motion in cases of economic need, but also social and familial desires. For example, at the end of 
2018 and 2019, large numbers of Venezuelans returned home to spend the holidays with their 
families, after which they returned to Brazil in the beginning of 2019 and 2020.113 Therefore, 
despite the clearly designated channel of mobility, the interaction between the limited state 
presence, favorable ecological conditions, and specific motive forces has allowed for the 
continuation (and growth) of pre-crisis forms of mobility.  
In fact, beyond these factors, there are local actors outside of the federally sanctioned 
response that have facilitated alternative modalities of movement through everyday, negotiated 
practices. Specifically, many of the indigenous communities that reside along the border 
throughout Roraima have come to operate as an informal structure supporting migrants along 
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their journey. In addition to the aforementioned practice within indigenous communities of 
charging migrants to navigate them through unofficial crossing points, many of the residents of 
the provide sustenance to migrants along their journey or, in some cases, house them. 



















Figure 19: Map of indigenous ethno-regions throughout the state of Roraima114 
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Figure 20: Map of the São Marcos and Raposa Serra do Sol indigenous lands115 
 
migrants often turn to them in desperation along the long journey to Boa Vista.116 Specifically, in 
the São Marcos indigenous land (among others) shown in Figure 20, migrants make informal 
agreements with the indigenous communities, offering to help with work on the land or other 
activities in exchange for a place to stay. 117 In this sense, these communities not only are acting 
to create their own channels of mobility, they are nourishing this mobility by offering alternative 
forms of social support outside of the government-run shelters in Pacaraima and Boa Vista. 
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Additionally, the indigenous communities that span the border have come to represent one of the 
most salient forms of mobility that circumvents the western state. Specifically, in 2019, 
following incidents at the border that I will describe in the next chapter, nearly 1,000 members of 
the Pemón community on the Venezuelan side of the border crossed into Pacaraima. However, 
rather than seeking shelter and service in the Operação Acolhida regime, they found refuge with 
their relatives residing in villages near the border. Many of them were able to easily integrate, 
given shared language and culture, and ended up staying indefinitely in the São Marcos 
indigenous land, across the villages of Bananal, Sorocaima, Sakaomota and Tarauparu. 
Markedly, this case study demonstrates how “shows that national borders, especially in the 
Northern Region, are often referred to by indigenous peoples as empty spaces or “green borders” 
– these are, in fact, spaces inhabited by indigenous populations.”118 
Nonetheless, I want to begin to introduce an idea here, which I will continue to elaborate 
in the next section, about the implications of expanded mobility. As noted by the new mobilities 
scholars, mobility does not ubiquitously entail a liberating experience for all those involved. 
Although some members of certain indigenous communities have disposed themselves to 
supporting both indigenous and non-indigenous migrants, this increased traffic has generated 
negative impacts on some of these populations. Some members of indigenous communities on 
the Brazilian side of the border have reported frustration concerning the migrants’ impact on 
public services, fear that the migrants will introduce infectious diseases in the communities, and 
concerns that the migrants will never leave the settlements.119 In fact, indigenous communities in 
São Marcos have reported daily recurring instances of Venezuelans invading their lands to cut 
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down wood in the forest and use the rivers and natural springs, which has polluted the 
environment and the water sources.120 Additionally, due to the expansion of traffic along 
clandestine trails along the border, organized crime has begun to expand in the region. Many 
local indigenous residents have expressed concerns with the growth in this traffic, especially as it 
has led to increased theft within their communities. Such frustration with Venezuelan mobility 
among indigenous communities near the border even led to a protest along the BR-174 for 
greater control of the border.121 Therefore, this not only serves as a critical reminder of the 
diverse and varied perspectives, practices, and impacts of mobility among indigenous 
communities, but it also sets the stage for a discussion of why mobility, though a critical 
resource, cannot be romanticized.  
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Chapter IV: Reterritorialization as a localized and discursive practice 
 
 In this chapter, I will explore the ways in which regional and local agents have worked to 
demarcate and restrict access to the national territory in response to the influx of migrants and 
the facilitation of this influx by other agents within the mobility regime. To do so, I will focus on 
the frictions that have been produced in the migratory process for Venezuelans as well as the 
embodied reality of this experience. Firstly, I will illustrate the ways in which different forms of 
mobility have been treated differently in distinct moments over the past several years by focusing 
on questions related to indigenous migration. In addition to being treated as threatening in the 
early moments of the crisis, the militarization of the federal humanitarian response has produced 
a differentially embodied experience of mobility for these individuals. Secondly, I will analyze 
the ways in which the border itself has been used by both the Venezuelan and Brazilian state to 
demonize various forms of mobility traversing the region for largely performative and discursive 
political purposes. Finally, this will set the stage for the last section, in which I expand on the 
ways in which local residents of Roraima have felt empowered to take the process of 
reterritorialization into their own hands. By analyzing a series of xenophobic protests and attacks 
on Venezuelans, I will illustrate the way in which power is constantly exercised and negotiated 
from a multiple of different localized points in mobility regimes. All in all, these examples will 
serve to further highlight the ways in which this reterritorialization is inextricably linked to the 
previously described process of deterritorialization in a dialectical relationship.  
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Continuations of colonial challenges to indigenous mobility and occupation 
Markedly, the mobility regime has, in different moments, treated specific forms of 
mobility as threatening, especially in the initial stages of the exacerbation of the crisis. As 
Venezuelan terrestrial migration began increasing in 2015, the Federal Police immediately 
reacted by deporting those Venezuelans who had entered on a tourist visa and were engaging in 
remunerated activities, who had an expired tourist visa, or who were undocumented 
altogether.122 Whereas only 54 Venezuelans were deported in 2015, the number grew to 445 in 
the following year.123 However, it is critical to note that these deportations were 
disproportionately aimed at indigenous migrants, primarily from the Warao community, who 
were fleeing from the economic and political crisis in the country in addition to a drought that 
inhibited their community from surviving on agricultural production alone.124 Of the nearly 500 
individuals deported from 2015 to 2016, 223 were members of indigenous communities.125 The 
influx of these individuals was highly visible in Boa Vista, where they sold traditional artisanal 
products or begged for money in the street. The municipal government, however, claimed that 
the deportations aimed to remove Venezuelans from the “subhuman” conditions in which they 
were living and to “guarantee that their rights were preserved.”126 Such a claim proves to be 
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incongruent with the reality these migrants face in Venezuela, as many reporting returning after 
being deported because of a lack of food where they live.127 Indeed, when contextualizing this 
within the broader history of the border described in Chapter II, these deportations illustrate two 
key insights about historical forms of mobility. Firstly, they can be seen as a continuation not 
only of the longstanding vision of Venezuela as a geopolitical threat to Brazil’s sovereignty, 
which has historically provoked processes of reterritorialization and increased state presence in 
the border region. Secondly, the stigmatization specifically of indigenous mobility represents an 
extension of colonial forms of violence that have invalidated indigenous occupation of land and, 
more specifically, limited the mobility of a traditionally nomadic tribe such as the Warao.   
Nonetheless, as I will continue to illustrate throughout this chapter, the Brazilian mobility 
regime is composed of a heterogenous body of actors that deploy a variety of often contradictory 
strategies that produce this crisscrossing of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. By the end 
of 2016, the federal response to the influx began to show signs of a shift towards the more 
humanitarian response for which it has gained international praise. In December of that year, the 
Federal Police announced plans to deport a group of 450 Venezuelans that they had detained 
living without appropriate documentation in Boa Vista, the majority of whom were Warao.128 
However, the Public Defender of the Union submitted an injunction request against the action, 
which was granted by the Federal Court.129 In her judgment, the circuit judge presiding over the 
decision cited Article N. 5 in the Federal Constitution, which dictates the equal treatment of 
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Brazilians and foreign residents in Brazil. Subsequently, the federal and municipal governments 
began transitioning towards measures to accommodate these flows of Venezuelans, as previously 
described. This clash between the Federal Police and the judiciary demonstrates the ways in 
which mobility regimes do not function as a coherent and singular source of power. Even within 
an entity that is often considered in functionalist terms such as the federal government, the 
visible and embodied outcomes of federal actions cannot be seen as a linear union of 
independent elements. 
Although this action recognizes the need to make mobility a more widely accessible 
resource, the indigenous migrant experience following this action illustrates the ways in which 
mobility cannot be treated as an indiscriminate form of liberation. Despite the purported 
transition to a humanitarian response in 2018, the federal response committee allocated its aid 
budget entirely to the Ministry of Defense, thus putting the armed forces at the helm of the 
administration of this aid. The involvement of the armed forces has been criticized as being 
incongruent with the principle of humanitarianism, especially as it relates to indigenous 
migrants. For instance, the sale of artisanal products, such as hammocks and baskets made from 
buriti fiber, represents one of the key sources of income and economic sustenance for Warao 
migrants in Brazil. However, when these individuals pass through the army’s control post at the 
border, the fiber or these items are often confiscated in excess of the legally permitted amount 
(considered contraband). As a result, Warao migrants have had to adjust their practices and even 
their routes of movement. One alternative that many have turned to is begging for money in the 
street, yet this also exposes them to the increased police presence in the border cities.130 
 




Although deportation is no longer in the legal arsenal of tools to control Venezuelan occupation 
of space in the borderland, the police has been used to displace migrants from public spaces, 
such as when Vice President Hamilton Mourão visited Boa Vista and Pacaraima in 2020.131 
Additionally, the disruption of Warao artisanal commerce creates friction in the back-and-forth 
rhythm of the nomadic community. For Warao migrants living in Roraima (or even in the 
neighboring state of Pará), it is common to vacillate between their home communities and their 
residence in Brazil in order to exchange clothes, food, and medicines from Brazil for crafts made 
by their family in Venezuela.132 Nonetheless, the seizure of fiber and artisanal products at the 
border does not necessarily preclude Warao people from continuing the activity in Brazil, as they 
can find other materials (such as nylon)133 and organizations such as UNHCR provide them with 
raw material134. However, Warao people have affirmed that these materials are of lower quality, 
as it is imported from the state of Maranhão because the buriti tree is protected in Roraima.135 
Similarly, the military administration of the shelters, especially the indigenous shelters of 
Pintolândia (Boa Vista) and Janokoida (Pacaraima), has further contributed to this dissonance 
between the ways in which mobility is represented within the regional and international 
community and the ways in which it is experienced at the individual level by indigenous 
migrants. Reports have indicated that military personnel at these shelters often disregard the 
needs of their residents or create a hostile environment. In a visit to the shelters in 2018, the 
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Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) found evidence that the military members leading 
the shelters ignored requests to coordinate services with caciques (indigenous community 
leaders) and that they used offensive verbiage while talking about the indigenous residents, 
referring to them as gafanhotos (locusts) and claiming that they are not interested in helping 
themselves in the long term. Looking at indigenous artisanal production and their experiences in 
the federal shelters underscores that mobility is more than just a linear path from origin to 
destination, but rather a series of conditions and practices that enable, channel, and block this 
path. As such, changes in traffic along these paths cannot be evaluated without a broader 
understanding of these practices. In other words, although the deportation of indigenous 
Venezuelan migrants clearly perpetuated colonial forms of violence against these communities, 
the subsequent processes of deterritorialization cannot be romanticized as a disembodied 
experience.  
 
The border as a geopolitical tool  
 In this section, I will highlight the ways in which the Venezuela-Brazil border has been 
employed in reterritorialization efforts in different moments for a variety of geopolitical motives. 
Specifically, I will explore the 2018 attempt to close the Brazilian side of the border by the state 
of Roraima because of the massive influx of migrants and the 2019 closure of the Venezuelan 
side of the border in response to attempts to deliver humanitarian aid to the country. Firstly, 
calling attention to these two instances helps to underscores that, even amidst the lack of 
infrastructure and state presence along the border, it has not achieved a fully deterritorialized 
status. In fact, by emphasizing the practical difficulty in truly barring movement across the 
border from either side, I will reinforce the ways in which mobility is not only an embodied and 
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practiced experience as previously described, but also a discursively constructed representation. 
Indeed, the attempts to seal the borders will set the stage for these representations to take an 
embodied form, as I will describe in the following section.  
 
The state of Roraima vying for control of the border 
 Despite the generally humanitarian approach adopted by the federal government and third 
sector, the influx of migrants has come to be associated in the local Brazilian imaginary with the 
structural issues facing the state of Roraima. The local hegemonic narrative sustains that 
Venezuelan migrants are responsible for “the increase in violence rates in the state, 
unemployment among Brazilians, a ‘healthcare chaos, and for turning Boa Vista, supposedly 
‘one of the best cities to live’ into an unsafe place to live.”136 Local news outlets, in particular, 
produce and reinforce these conceptions of the transformation of the border region. One article, 
titled “Pacaraima ‘turned into’ Santa Elena, merchants say”, explains how the local shopkeepers 
and vendors that chose to open businesses in Pacaraima due to the calm nature of the city are 
now having to face conditions akin to those across the border. The author describes how 
Venezuelan migrants engage in predatory competitive behaviors, such as selling the same 
products or items as Brazilian merchants in front of their shops at half the price, suggesting that 
they have led to the closure of local businesses. She then quotes a series of merchants, who 
complain of the lack of border control, the lack of street cleaning, the violence, and the number 
of homeless people, all of which they link to the influx of migrants. One individual quoted in the 
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article claimed that “immigration came to destroy the state.”137 Even national news outlets 
fomented such narratives. One article from the Folha de São Paulo, titled “Invasion of 
Venezuelans fleeing from crisis in the country causes chaos in Roraima”, draws similar links 
between the influx of migrants and issues such as increasing strain on hospitals, higher levels of 
violence, malaria outbreaks, and prostitution. In addition to this, the author explains how high 
traffic areas in Boa Vista, such as the bus station, now reek of “urine and smeared feces,” and 
how “the city is experiencing a scene from a post-war film, with a lot of trash piled up in the 
streets, disheveled traffic in the commercial center, and Venezuelans arriving in every moment.” 
Perhaps most emblematic of the hegemonic discourse, the article quotes the mayor of Pacaraima, 
Juliano Torquato, who explains that “an effort is needed to keep them in Venezuela in some way. 
Pacaraima will need to be rebuilt, from how chaotic it is.”138  
Although the process of accommodating such an influx undoubtedly has presented 
challenges to the region, local authorities and new sources tended to overlook the true roots of 
the issues being faced and to erroneously portray the role of Venezuelan migration. For instance, 
despite sensationalist reports that the migration would bring about a collapse of the local health 
system, federal data from 2013 indicates that the system was already in precarious conditions, 
having been identified as the third worst in the country in terms of capacity per habitant.139 
Similarly, the lack of stable industries and high percentage of the population depending on the 
public sector for employment in the region puts claims of Venezuelans creating an employment 
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crisis into question.140 In a more general sense, the previously described haphazard process of 
municipal emancipation can also partially account for these problems attributed to Venezuelan 
migrants, as Roraima has struggled economically from a lack of industry, socially from weak 
public infrastructure, and politically from isolation from the federal government for several 
decades now due to the lack of planning and resources committed to this emancipation process. 
This is not to downplay or negate the true hardships being faced by residents of Boa Vista or 
Pacaraima, as they indeed have had to contend with such issues as outbreaks of infectious 
diseases and a limited government funding.141 Rather, my aim is to underscore how this spatial 
imaginary of Roraima is constructed in such a way to hide the structural conditions that have 
produced the current situation. In other words, I want to highlight that, although issues such an 
unemployment may now be more salient because of the influx of migrants, they are indeed 
structural and historical issues that did not simply emerge because of this influx.  
 In response to the construction of this spatial imaginary of Roraima as a previously 
harmonious zone now ravaged by Venezuelan migration, the state government responded with 
an attempt to bar this influx and restore a clear delineation between Brazilian and Venezuelan 
territories. In April of 2018, Suely Campos, the then governor of the state of Roraima, submitted 
a request to the Federal Supreme Court for the “temporary closing of the Brazil-Venezuela 
border in order to prevent the disorderly immigration flux from producing more devastating 
effects for Brazilians.”142 In an open letter that she wrote following the request, she explains that 
these effects include outbreaks of epidemics and an increase in the influx of drugs, guns, and 
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criminals. Furthermore, she criticized the response of the federal government, which she 
described as an omission, considering the lack of infrastructure and security at the border. In her 
words, “we request the temporary restriction of or limit to the entrance of new migrants until the 
Union assumes its constitutional duty of promoting measures in the area of security control, 
health, and sanitary surveillance.”143 Ironically, the request came shortly after the federal 
government’s rollout of Operação Acolhida, which aims to address all of these concerns. In fact, 
almost immediately following the announcement of the request, the president at the time, Michel 
Temer, released a statement affirming that closing the border would be “unimaginable.”144 Thus, 
while awaiting an official response from the federal justice system (and likely recognizing the 
legal improbability and practical difficulty of closing the border), Campos issued a decree in 
August that, among other measures, required Venezuelan migrants to present a valid passport to 
use the healthcare or education system, once again citing the supposed omission of the federal 
government. In effect, this almost entirely excluded migrants from these services, considering 
the majority of them cross the border without passports. In justifying the decree, Campos 
affirmed that the Venezuelan exodus has impacted the health, education, and security systems in 
Roraima and asserted that they can no longer “allow a Venezuelan to be serviced to the detriment 
of a Brazilian.”145 In this sense, Campos’ response transformed from an attempt to directly 
hinder movement to attacking mobility by making social reproduction unsustainable.  
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 Campos’ actions then set off a series of legal actions, ultimately demanding a decision 
about whether to restrict Venezuelan access to Brazil. Following her issuance of the decree, the 
Federal Public Ministry and the Public Defender’s Office of the Union emitted requests that the 
decree be suspended. In response, judge Helder Girão Barreto, from the 1st Federal Circuit Court 
of the state, issued a decision, temporarily prohibiting Venezuelans from entering the country, 
until they could reach a “numeric balance” with the interiorization program.146 In reality, though, 
the border was only closed for approximately 15 hours, as the federal appellate judge Kassio 
Nunes Marques suspended Barreto’s injunction, following a request from the Union. Marques 
argued that such an action would violate international obligations that the country has agreed to 
regarding migration. In the same week, the Federal Supreme Court also responded to Campos’ 
request for the temporary closure of the border. The justice Rosa Weber denied the request, 
affirming not only that the action would conflict with several treaties signed by Brazil regarding 
migration, but also that such measures could deprive individuals of the possibility of requesting 
refuge in the country.147 Thus, both of these decisions—from Weber and Marques—reopened the 
border, setting legal precedent limiting the future possibility for reterritorialization efforts. 
However, despite the clarity and consistency in this messaging, tracing this legal back-and-forth 
across different branches and levels of government underscores the difficulty in cementing either 
mobility or immobility. In fact, although the reigning decision was in favor of mobility, later in 
this chapter I will illustrate how these discourses in favor of immobility trickled down to the 
local population, reinitiating this decision to reinstate the border.  
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Venezuela’s closure of the border as an assertion of sovereignty  
 Of course, the Venezuela-Brazil border is constituted by bidirectional movement, despite 
the uneven nature of these flows in recent years. Movements from Brazil to Venezuela that have 
expanded or changed due to the exacerbation of the crisis have set the ground for a process of 
discursive reterritorialization from the Venezuelan side of the border as well. Specifically, in 
February of 2019, the government of Brazil announced its plans to facilitate the transport of 
humanitarian aid into Venezuela per the request of self-declared interim president Juan Guaidó. 
Guaidó mobilized a wide contingent of Venezuelans both in Brazil and in Venezuela to organize 
a series of trucks loaded with medicine and food to traverse through Boa Vista and Pacaraima 
into Santa Elena de Uairén.148 Markedly, as previously described, the flow of medicines and food 
items into Venezuela has become commonplace over the past several years, thus becoming a sort 
of rhythmic norm. In this sense, the envoy in and of itself is not particularly notable in terms of 
mobility; rather, it is once again the discursive representations of this movement that produce a 
clash of reterritorial and deterritorial practices. The envoy was part of a broader geopolitical 
strategy launched by a global coalition including the United States to infiltrate the country with 
aid from Colombia, Brazil, and an undisclosed island in the Caribbean. This coalition consisted 
of several countries that recognize Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela and sustain 
that Maduro is a fraudulent dictator exacerbating the current crisis.149 Therefore, in addition to 
representing an affirmation of the crisis that Maduro denies, the envoy comes to represent an 
expression of power—the ability of the opposition countries to penetrate Venezuela.   
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 Naturally, considering the opposition’s exercise of power was built on the penetrable 
nature of the border, Maduro’s denial of this power and reassertion of his own sovereignty 
sought to reinforce the impermeability of the border. As the envoy of aid was scheduled for the 
23rd of February, Maduro ordered the closing of the border on the 21st.150 Consequently, he sent 
at least five tanks and several trucks to the border to block the aid.151 The move provoked a 
protest among residents in Santa Elena de Uairén, especially those from the Pemón indigenous 
community, who inhabit the Gran Sabana region of the state of Bolivar and who have had a long 
history of conflict with Venezuelan security and military forces. When the military forces 
blocked off the Troncal 10, a violent confrontation took place between the two groups, leaving 
one Pemon individual dead and several injured. Notably, precisely because of the lack of medical 
supplies in the hospital on the Venezuelan side of the border, six of the injured members of the 
community were transferred to Boa Vista for treatment.152  
Nonetheless, the porous nature of the border and the difficulty in blocking flows made 
these efforts to stop the envoy relatively futile, as much of the aid was inevitably transferred to 
the Venezuelan side of the border.153 In addition, beyond the envoy itself, migrants were also 
able to continue to smuggle food and products back into Venezuela or flee the country despite 
the closure of the official entry by using the previously described clandestine trails through 
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indigenous territories. However, due to the increased military presence at the border, many of 
these migrants had to bribe members of the Venezuelan National Guard in order to access these 
trails; if they did not have the money to pay the steep fines, they had to seek out even longer 
trails to cross for free.154 The Pemón people specifically were able to cross into the villages of 
other indigenous communities which with they share cultural ties to seek refuge, as described in 
Chapter III. Such practices underscore the disparity between Maduro’s discursive assertion of 
sovereignty through the border closure and the localized reality of border making.  
Maduro’s closure of the border called attention to the ways in which the two regions are 
dependent on mutual forms of exchange. Most saliently, the package of humanitarian aid served 
as a reminder of Venezuela’s reliance on necessities, such as food items and medicines, from 
Brazil. At the same time, however, the closure also highlighted Venezuela’s control over 
Roraima’s energy supply. As previously mentioned, Roraima is the only state in Brazil not 
connected to the national electrical system and thus receives the majority of its electricity supply 
from Venezuela (130 megawatts of its 200-megawatt total consumption). Following the closure 
of the border, the current governor of the state of Roraima, Antonio Denarium, expressed 
concerns about the potential cutting of energy from Venezuela if tensions continued to increase, 
which would drive the state to have to ration energy stores.155 In fact, one of the first meetings 
held between authorities from Brazil and Venezuela concerning the border closure was 
specifically focused on how to negotiate the reopening because of the importance of the 
economic exchange between the two regions, namely the aforementioned products and 
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electricity.156 Consequently, Maduro reopened the border in May of 2019, roughly three months 
after its initial closure.157 It may seem ironic that the same form of mobility (commercial 
exchange) that provoked the closing of the border served as justification for its reopening. Such a 
paradox exemplifies the dialectic between reterritorialization and deterritorialization. 
Moreover, the politicization of this humanitarian aid speaks to the broader geopolitical 
project that has influenced the response of the Brazilian state to the influx of Venezuelan 
migrants. Just as the envoy represented an attack on Maduro’s sovereignty over Venezuela, the 
movement of people across the border has similarly come to play part of Brazil’s ideological 
rejection of the Bolivarian government. Although the humanitarian response of the Brazilian 
government to the arrival of such large numbers of Venezuelans may seem incongruent with 
Bolsonaro’s nationalistic rhetoric, the geopolitics of the region can at least partially resolve this 
oxymoron. As one UNHCR employee at the border explained that, because the current Brazilian 
government is critical of the Venezuelan government, it “feels the obligation to shelter those who 
have suffered as a result of that regime.”158 Providing migrants with humanitarian conditions and 
protections in Brazil thus helps to create a portrait of a sympathetic and flourishing right-wing 
country in the face of the inhumane and authoritarian failure of a left-wing country. Perhaps most 
emblematic of this discourse, at the beginning of 2019, Bolsonaro pulled Brazil out of the Global 
Compact for Migration. However, his Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Ernesto Araújo, 
announced that “in the case of Venezuelans that are fleeing from the Maduro regime, we will 
 
156 “Reabertura Da Fronteira é Discutida Em Encontro.” Folha de Boa Vista, March 4, 2019. 
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157 “Venezuela Reabre Fronteira Com Brasil e Aruba, Diz Ministro.” Folha de Boa Vista, May 10, 2019. 
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continue to shelter them.”159 Indeed, despite refusing to commit to global cooperation on 
migratory issues, Bolsonaro soon after announced the extension of Operação Acolhida before 
Temer’s order expired.160 Much like the envoy, these actions illustrate how movement across the 
border has come to become deeply intertwined with politicized conceptions of humanitarianism 
and ideological legitimacy.  
 
Local roraimenses usurping control of the mobility regime 
 Although I have already touched upon the ways in which the mobility regime in Brazil is 
constituted by a wide variety of agents exercising power from different points at different 
moments, I want to expand upon this idea in this section. Specifically, I will demonstrate how 
there are actors beyond the state that exercise control over the mobility of Venezuelan migrants. 
Earlier, I touched on the ways in which these supra-state agents produce and practice forms of 
mobility through processes of deterritorialization; now, I will illustrate how these same agents 
have worked to reinforce the border and symbolic forms of differentiation between the national 
territories and their residents. Of course, this is not to say that the mobility regime can be spliced 
into its constitutive parts and analyzed as an additive activity. In fact, I will explore the 
interaction between the state and these extra-state actors in order to illustrate how mobility 
regimes can be treated as ‘problem spaces’, in that they represent constantly transforming 
relations of power.  
 
159 “Governo Bolsonaro Retira o Brasil Do Pacto Global Pela Imigração Da ONU.” Correio Braziliense, January 8, 
2019. https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/brasil/2019/01/08/interna-brasil,729696/brasil-deixa-pacto-
global-pela-imigracao-da-onu.shtml.  
160 Maisonnave, Fabiano, and Avener Prado. “Governo Bolsonaro Prorroga Acolhida De Venezuelanos Em 
Roraima.” Folha de S.Paulo, January 17, 2019. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2019/01/governo-bolsonaro-
prorroga-acolhida-de-venezuelanos-em-roraima.shtml.  
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 As previously described, local authorities and news sources have constructed a spatial 
imaginary in the state of Roraima that treats it as an oasis that has been invaded and degraded by 
Venezuelan migrants. These discursive representations combined with the true economic, social, 
and political difficulties of the border region have generated a generalized xenophobic fear and 
frustration among the residents of Pacaraima and Boa Vista. Perhaps one of the most notable 
everyday manifestations of this hostility are the slurs used against Venezuelans near the border; 
one study reviewed a series of humor and news pages for the state of Roraima on social media 
and found that the use of terms such as veneca (pejorative slur to refer to Venezuelan migrants), 
praga (pest, infestation, plague), and peste (plague, pest) had become commonplace.161 Another 
slur often used against Venezuelans in the region is oichenta (a combination of ochenta and 
oitenta, the Spanish and Portuguese words for eighty), as a way to shame the Venezuelan sex 
workers who often charge a lower rate than their Brazilian counterparts (sometimes eighty reais, 
but oftentimes less).162 Considering the federal government, in tandem with international 
organizations and the civil society, had committed to a humanitarian response, this growing 
stigmatization of Venezuelan migrants led local residents to call on other state actors to take 
action to adopt a different approach to limit the flows. In addition to widespread support of the 
request to close the border, the population began to request additional policing of the cities, 
especially at night due to concerns about unemployed and homeless Venezuelans occupying the 
streets.163  
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162 G. da Silva Sarmento, Gilmara, and F. dos Santos Rodrigues. “Entre a acolhida e o rechaço: breves notas sobre a 
violência e os paradoxos da migração venezuelana para o Brasil.” Essay. In Migrações Venezuelanas, 242-249. 
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163 Gonzalo, Cora. “Com Comércio Em Crise, Onda De Violência Aumenta Em Pacaraima.” Folha de Boa Vista, 
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 However, the disconnect between the federal government and the local population led the 
latter group to take the impetus to secure the national territory into their own hands. On August 
18, 2018, residents of Pacaraima initiated a peaceful protest against Venezuelan immigration, 
following an incident in which a Brazilian business owner was attacked and robbed by a group of 
Venezuelans. When the protest ended, residents began to circle the city in small groups, stealing 
and burning the belongings of Venezuelans, attacking localities that sheltered Venezuelans, and 
attacking them with rocks and improvised bombs. The residents’ actions then turned from the 
city to the border, where they chased migrants past the border, until the Venezuelan authorities 
intervened to prevent the mob from crossing to their side.164 Staying on the Brazilian side, the 
residents heckled the Brazilian Army for not intervening and supporting their efforts, sang the 
country’s national anthem, and screamed out statements of hate against the “venecas” that they 
had chased out. The local state actors took very few actions to protect Venezuelans or diffuse the 
situation, as the army had limited jurisdiction to act as a police unit because it was deployed on a 
humanitarian mission. The only instances in which either the armed forces or local police 
intervened were to rope off the border in order to prevent Brazilians from continuing to pursue 
Venezuelans past the border and to protect Venezuelans that were hiding in the military area. 
Eventually, they constructed a makeshift barrier, consisting of a pile of tires that they had set on 
fire, to block Venezuelan access to the country.165 Thus, in the face of a federal government 
refusing to close the border and police the region, the local residents felt emboldened to take 
border and immigration control into their own hands.  
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 Markedly, this local control exercised over the border and Venezuelan mobility was not a 
fleeting, momentary instance of anarchy, but rather a coordinated effort to reterritorialize the 
border region in spite of Brazilian state efforts to propagate fluid mobility. The following day, 
the Federal Highway Police negotiated a truce of sorts, allowing for the opening of the Troncal 
10/BR-174 and, thus, the inflow of Venezuelans looking for refuge and the outflow of Brazilians 
looking for gas resumed, though the dynamics of these flows had changed. The number of 
Venezuelans crossing the border daily dropped from 800 to 1,000 to at least half this figure.166 In 
addition, some sources reported that the local residents continued to operate as a pseudo-militia 
following the incident. Despite the opening of the highway, some were seen celebrating victory 
and cheering that, “quem manda no Brasil é os brasileiros” (“Brazilians are the ones who call 
the shots in Brazil”).167 In the following days, both Venezuelans and Brazilians reported seeing 
local residents organizing carreatas da paz (motorcades of peace), de facto patrolling missions to 
prevent Venezuelan migrants from occupying the streets and public spaces of Pacaraima. 
Interestingly, the local police forces denied this information, claiming that the situation in the 
city had calmed down after the day of chaos. However, participants of the carreatas da paz 
openly spoke about their actions, as one of them explained that, “We are going to stop them from 
staying here, we are defending our home, our physical integrity. Almost all of them that were 
here were criminals.”168 As one source described it, the residents forced migrants to live under an 
“informal curfew”, as many would spend the day in Pacaraima in search of food and working on 
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their documentation and then spend the night just across the border, in a small, covered area near 
a truck stop on the Venezuelan side.169  
 However, the locally deployed reterritorialization strategy was ultimately transformed 
because of the federal government’s intervention, illustrating the ways in which the mobility 
regime represents a problem space where different agents interact and compete with one another. 
Initially, the federal government ordered a group of 120 members of the National Force and a 
group of 36 health professionals to be sent to the region in order to control the actions of the 
residents and attend to the migrants that had been injured.170 In addition, by the end of the month, 
former president Michel Temer signed a decree of Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO), an 
executive power that the president can use in instances of extreme disorder when traditional 
security forces have been exhausted. Although the decree did not order additional members of 
the Armed Forces to be sent to the region, it authorized the roughly 700 military members 
already at the border (both with Venezuela and with Guyana) to act as a police force. In other 
words, if another attack were to occur against Venezuelan migrants, they would then have the 
legal sanction to intervene.171 However, the additional police presence of the state did not negate 
entirely the influence of local residents on the mobility regime. For instance, in 2019, residents 
organized another protest to request further security and organization of the border city, which 
scared migrants and led them to seek protection in the Operação Acolhida posts in anticipation 
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of a recurrence of the violence from the year prior.172 Notably, the fact that the migrants chose to 
seek protection from the military likely indicates their recognition of the shifting power 
dynamics instituted by the GLO. Therefore, the interaction between the strategies deployed by 
both the state and the local residents, competing to accommodate and bar the influx of migrants, 
have produced dynamic outcomes on Venezuelan mobility within the region.  
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Chapter V: Rerouting channels of migration—a strategy of territorial 
ambiguities 
 
In this chapter, I want to address the third prong of the Operação Acolhida strategy that 
has generated perhaps the most international attention concerning the Brazilian response to the 
Venezuelan crisis: the interiorization program. The strategy aims to voluntarily relocate 
Venezuelan migrants living in Roraima to other areas of the country. Because of the 
humanitarian principles that underlie the program, many have lauded it and the Brazilian 
government for its ingenuity in designing such a novel solution. In the next two sections, 
however, I want to engage in a critical analysis of some of the theoretical and practical 
considerations relating to the program. Firstly, I will demonstrate how interiorizing migrants has 
underscored the limitations of mobility as an emancipatory resource. In this sense, I affirm the 
new mobilities scholars’ assertion that mobility cannot be romanticized. Secondly, I will analyze 
the way in which the interiorization program has somewhat distracted from the underlying issues 
related to integration in the state of Roraima. By engaging with the concepts of topography and 
topology, I argue that the redistribution of migrants throughout the country should not stand in 
place of the need to transform the border region to better accommodate future migratory 
influxes.  
 
Interiorization as a strategy of displaced immobilities 
 Whereas the previously described reception and sheltering strategies are intended to 
accommodate the influx of Venezuelan migrants at the border, the interiorization program aims 
to achieve long-term integration of the population by dispersing them to other cities throughout 
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the country. Due to concerns about the social and economic capacity of Roraima to receive such 
a large influx of people, the government included this component in Operação Acolhida, 
believing that the larger job markets and stronger infrastructure of other regions of the country 
would be better equipped to receive them. The program is entirely voluntary, meaning any 
Venezuelan living in Roraima that pertains to one of its designated modalities of eligibility can 
opt into the program. These modalities have been expanded over time in order to give a wider 
range of Venezuelans the possibility of being interiorized. The first departure of Venezuelan 
migrants took place on April 4, 2018173, at which point the modalities were: institutional, where a 
migrant could be transferred to a shelter in another city where an opening became available; 
family reunification, where a family member living in another city could agree to accept a 
migrant living in Roraima to be transferred to them; and civil society, where an organization 
from the civil society assumes responsibility for receiving them in another city.174 Shortly after, 
the ‘job opening’ modality was added, allowing for migrants to be transferred if a company 
expressed interest in hiring them for a position in another city. Furthermore, the ‘family 
reunification’ modality was expanded to cover ‘social reunification’ as well, meaning any 
Venezuelan with housing in another city who is willing to accept a migrant from the border 
could also participate.175 (Some sources still maintain a distinction between social and family 
reunification in their reporting, while others aggregate the two.)  
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All in all, Operação Acolhida is thus divided into three key phases—reception, 
sheltering, and interiorization—to form a simple, but comprehensive linear succession for 
migrants. Ideally, migrants pass through the border and begin to complete the documentation to 
obtain legal status to be in the country. They are expected to stay in the shelters for roughly 15 to 
45 days. In this time, they have the option to express interest in participating in the interiorization 
program and complete the corresponding requirements, which, beyond being legally 
documented, include being vaccinated, being in good health condition based on a clinical 
evaluation, and consenting to participating in the process with a signed form.176 For the job 
opening and family reunification modalities, the destination is clearly contingent on where the 
company or family member (or friend) are located. For the civil society and institutional 
modules, migrants do not have the option of choosing what city they are placed in, but they do 
have the ability to turn down an opening once it becomes available.177 Additionally, the process 
by which migrants are matched with civil society organizations or shelters is entirely based on 
the profile of these organizations (e.g., some are better equipped to receive families, others are 
better equipped for unaccompanied adults). From there, transportation is handled entirely by the 
various agents in Operação Acolhida, with the majority of flights being conducted by the 
Brazilian Air Force (FAB), the remaining commercial flights purchased by the IOM or civil 
society organizations, and bus tickets (to Manaus) purchased by Operação Acolhida.178  
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 During the two-year period from the program’s inception to prior to the onset of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, these agents from Operação Acolhida as well as local and state 
governments throughout Brazil collaborated greatly in order to expand it, both in terms of 
quantity of migrants resettled and geographical reach of this resettlement. As seen in Figure 21, 
Figure 21: Bar chart of interiorized Venezuelans from April 2018 to February 2020179 
 
the number of Venezuelans that pass through the interiorization program on a monthly basis 
grew by a factor of 10, beginning around 300 migrants per month to just over 3,000 in the 
beginning of 2020. Although the program initially only resettled migrants to São Paulo (SP) and 
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Cuiabá (MT)180, by the beginning of 2020, it had expanded to a total of 448 cities and every state 
in the country.181 Figure 22 shows the total geographic distribution, and Figure 23 shows the  
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Figure 23: Change in distribution of interiorized Venezuelans from 2018 to 2020183 
 
expansion of this distribution over time. 
The interiorization program has come to garner notable international attention in the 
context of the regional response to the Venezuelan diaspora, as it is one of the most novel 
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mechanisms that any government has adopted. Specifically, I want to focus on the question of 
local integration, as the program has been advertised as Operação Acolhida’s main strategy for 
socio-economic integration. As can be seen in Figures 22 and 23, the program has sent the vast 
majority of migrants to locations in the South and Southeast regions of the country. At face 
value, this redistribution seems as though it would represent immense progress towards 
integrating migrants, especially considering that these two regions concentrate 70.3% of the 
country’s GDP (compared with 5.4% in the North).184 Nonetheless, problems have arisen. Many 
of the receiving cities were unfamiliar with migrant integration, thus incapable of sufficiently 
supporting Venezuelans in finding jobs, finding housing, learning the language, or dealing with 
their documentation. 185  In many cities, for instance, migrants are transferred to shelters meant 
for individuals struggling with addiction or facing homelessness.186 In fact, a study of the shelters 
tracked by the UNHCR at the end of 2018 found that only 40 percent of interiorized migrants 
eligible to work had found a job. Despite establishing working groups in large destination cities, 
such as São Paulo and Caxias de Sul (in Rio Grande do Sul), to continue to monitor and support 
interiorized migrants, many of these groups stopped operating. As such, organizations from the 
civil society in these cities reported cases of migrants facing labor exploitation and 
homelessness. As João Carlos Jarochinski, a professor from the Federal University of Roraima, 
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noted, this interiorization combined with a lack of integration represents a “transference of 
vulnerability.”187 In this sense, mobility in and of itself is insufficient to achieve integration.  
In response to these concerns, countless agents at several different levels have had to 
mobilize in order to transform the embodied reality of interiorization. Perhaps the most salient 
evidence of this local transformation accompanying the interiorization program is the civil 
society response, with countless organizations mobilizing to meet the needs of the growing 
Venezuelan populations in their respective cities, such as Migraflix in São Paulo or Círculos de 
Hospitalidade in Santa Catarina. It would be well outside the scope of this project to go into 
detail on these types of efforts throughout any of the over 400 municipalities that participate in 
the interiorization program, but I want to highlight one specific effort as an example of the 
transformation of local and national infrastructure that has not received due attention. The federal 
government, upon recognizing these integration issues, launched a strategy at the beginning of 
2020 to establish Núcleos Regionais de Interiorização (Regional Interiorization Centers, 
NURIN), a series of offices throughout the twelve military regions of the country with both 
military personnel and staff from the UNHCR to coordinate integration efforts. Specifically, 
these regional hubs would connect with individuals from the local civil society, private sector, 
and governments and municipalities in order to strengthen and integrate support networks.188 The 
establishment of the NURINs not only represents the way in which the Brazilian migratory 
landscape is in constant transformation in order to respond to these needs, but it also creates an 
agile infrastructure to support the continued growth and change of this local infrastructure. In 
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this sense, such efforts indicate a shift in the national strategy away from a romanticization of 
mobility which, in effect, displaced immobilities to places outside of the border region.  
 
Roraima: imagining topological futures  
Although the interiorization program is advancing throughout the country, I want to call 
attention to the implications that the underlying logic of the program holds for the state of 
Roraima. Over the course of the expansion of the program, discourses have shifted, such that it 
does not represent an integration strategy so much as a liberating form of movement for 
Venezuelans experiencing a disconnect between their envisioned and embodied migration 
experience—an escape. Although the program was inaugurated prior to the attacks of the 
summer of 2018, this incident came to serve as a justification for the rapid expansion and 
intensification of the program.189  Specifically, Viviane Esse, special advisor of the Casa Civil, 
announced plans to interiorize a thousand Venezuelans by the beginning of September of that 
year, a notable increase considering the government had only been able to transfer 820 people in 
the six months up to that point. She cited several measures that would streamline the process, 
including renting spaces to shelter Venezuelans in other cities.190 These actions were justified not 
only based on the real threat facing Venezuelans living in Roraima, but also the desires of these 
migrants themselves. Whereas one news outlet reported that as 8 out of every 10 migrants 
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reported the desire to leave the region leading up to the attacks,191 the UNHCR found that that 
figure was once as high as 90 percent.192 There are, of course, Venezuelan migrants would prefer 
to stay near the border in hopes of being able to return to their country one day and to facilitate 
the sending of goods and money to family members at home; however, in light of the pressures 
on local systems, many preferred to find refuge elsewhere.193 Whereas the mobility regime 
initially began rerouting channels of mobility in order to achieve socioeconomic integration of 
these migrants, it came to focus more on questions of protecting migrants and diffusing the 
tensions that had accumulated in the region.  
In the same breath, by sponsoring Venezuelan movement out of the border region, to 
some extent, the strategy inadvertently validates the xenophobic fears and anger of local 
residents. When seen in the context of the local residents’ reterritorialization strategy, which 
treated Venezuelan migration into the region as threatening and aimed to expel these individuals, 
the program seems to affirm this rejection of the prospect of a deterritorialized border region. For 
instance, Eduardo Pazuello, the then coordinator of the humanitarian task force in Roraima, 
announced his support of the intensification of the program in order to avoid the future 
occurrence of similar incidents of violence.194 This, of course, treats the accumulation of 
Venezuelans as the root of the problem (as opposed to the xenophobic sentiments of the border 
population stemming from the frail local infrastructure). Indeed, the program has confirmed 
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xenophobic sentiments among the local population. For instance, one study that reviewed social 
media pages of border residents in Roraima found people praising the interiorization program, 
with comments such as “they should take all Venezuelans away from here” and “get rid of them 
all! And close the border”.195 In the xenophobic imaginary of a local resident, an interiorized 
Venezuelan is equivalent to a deported Venezuelan, as the final destination is of little importance 
as long as it is not Roraima. This is perhaps what is most notable about the interiorization 
program—although it may represent a form of deterritorialization on the national scale, it 
simultaneously reinforces the reterritorialization of the border region. This is not to say that 
xenophobia has not been addressed in the region, nor that the interiorization program is based on 
innately xenophobic principles. Rather, these observations highlight a key insight concerning the 
ongoing power that local agents continue to exercise within the mobility regime. In addition to 
having shaped the discursive representations of Venezuelan mobility that triggered the 
intensification of the interiorization program, the local authorities and population were able to 
successfully influence and coopt the ways in which these mobilities are practiced.  
 Furthermore, even though the principles underlying the program are not inherently 
xenophobic, I would like to denaturalize the way in which they treat the Brazilian landscape. 
Many of the ideas that have justified the need for interiorization treat Roraima as a topographical 
object. Topography refers to an approach to describing and quantifying landscapes in which 
space is treated as absolute or as a container, composed of units that are internally coherent and 
externally distinct.196 When referring to the program, many people treat it as a truism that 
 
195 A.D. Oliveira, Isaac, and E.G. Lacerda. “Imigracao venezuelana e xenofobia em Roraima, Brasil.” Essay. In 
Migrações Venezuelanas, 231-235. Nepo/Unicamp, 2018. Brazil.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-
pdf/migrações_venezuelanas.pdf. 
196 Lash, Scott. “Deforming the Figure: Topology and the Social Imaginary.” Theory, Culture & Society 29, no. 4-5 
(2012): 261–87. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276412448829.  
89 
Roraima does not have the capacity to sustain a large number of residents. For instance, Antonio 
Manoel de Barros, the new operational coordinator of Operação Acolhida who assumed control 
of the mission at the beginning of 2020, explained that his strict focus would be on expanding 
interiorization further, because Roraima could never sustain such flows, which would “collapse” 
the system.197 By treating the current status of Roraima as immutable and innate, the conditions 
which produced it are entirely overlooked. In fact, many of the critiques that have arisen 
concerning the interiorization program is that it distracts from integration issues within Roraima. 
Although the majority of Venezuelans surveyed after the attacks in Pacaraima wanted to leave 
the region, a prior survey from the IOM found that, of those migrants that wanted to stay in 
Brazil, the vast majority expressed the desire to live in the border region, with 59 percent 
wanting to live in Amazonas and 22 percent in Roraima.198 In light of such insights, Camila 
Asano, program coordinator with Conectas, has advocated for a new pillar of Operação Acolhida 
that focuses on integration in the state in order to build lasting solutions for these migrants.199  
 Perhaps the clearest example of the way in which such a topographical approach fails to 
create long-term solutions can be seen in Manaus. Given the fact that Manaus is directly 
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Figure 24: Map of the segment of the BR-174 running through Roraima200 
 
that has received the largest number of migrants. In addition to being able to take a bus running 
along the BR-174 from Boa Vista to Manaus, migrants could also reach the city by means of the 
interiorization program. In fact, the city came to be the number one recipient of interiorized 
Venezuelans in Brazil, having received 4,572 migrants in the period from April 2018 to April 
2020 (over 2,000 more than the second highest city of São Paulo).201 However, the state of 
Amazonas in general, and its capital city of Manaus as well, was similarly ill-equipped to receive 
such an influx.202 As early as 2017, there were reports of indigenous Venezuelans leaving 
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shelters in Manaus to attempt to establish a life in the neighboring state of Pará, given the limited 
economic opportunities they found in Amazonas.203 In fact, by 2019, Manaus was the capital city 
with the highest unemployment rate in the country. As such, in mid-2019, the federal 
government made the decision to extend Operação Acolhida to the city, especially in light of the 
incredibly long wait times to apply for asylum (an average of three months at the time). Unlike in 
Boa Vista, however, the extension of federal assistance did not set up an extensive network of 
shelters to house the migrants, but rather aimed to bring other services to the state, including 
improved document emission, resources to attend to populations living in the streets, and 
interiorization.204 In other words, in a little over a year, Manaus went from being the most 
important destination for interiorization to becoming an origin site for the program. This fact 
perhaps most clearly illustrates the shortcomings of the program as the key integration strategy. 
It underscores the ways in which, at a federal level, there is a greater concern with distribution 
rather than integration per se. Just as in Boa Vista, rather than addressing the underlying 
structural issues that hinder Venezuelan integration, the response was to disperse misery and 
precarity outside of Manaus, so as not to come to a head in a highly visible and violent manner as 
in Pacaraima.  
As such, just like Camila Asano from Conectas, I want to suggest a more topological 
approach to building solutions for the state of Roraima. The field of topology emerged in 
response to concerns about topography, contending that space is continuous, connected, and in 
constant de/reformation. As Lash explains, “a topographical object is a form, a fixed form. The 
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topological object is anti-form, in-form, de-form.”205 In other words, topology is less concerned 
with specifying and quantifying readable differences between places, but rather understanding 
the ways in which these spatial characteristics may converge or diverge through constant 
processes of transformation. Notably, the Brazilian federal government and other large players in 
the national mobility regime have already begun adopting a more topological approach to the 
issue, as exemplified in the previously described changes to localities receiving Venezuelans in 
other regions. By investing in the social and economic capacity of the border region itself, the 
government would not only provide a more sustainable option for migrants who wish to maintain 
proximity to the border but would also address underlying issues faced by Brazilian residents of 
the state that have produced both resentment against the federal government and the recently 
arrived Venezuelan migrants. I do not mean to oversimplify this issue, as I recognize that 
increasing economic development of the region has historically entailed colonial forms of 
violence against indigenous communities and ecological depletion of the environment. Indeed, at 
the same time that topological thinking encourages us to imagine future transformations of the 
spaces around us, it also calls us to reflect on the changes that have led to the current state of 
affairs, such as this deep colonial history. It is precisely this linkage of past and future forms of 
transformation that can revolutionize the current stagnant and topographical views of Roraima in 
order to build long-term solutions for Venezuelan migrants.  
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Chapter VI: Final considerations 
 In this thesis, I have aimed to bring a variety of geographical theories into dialogue with 
the reality of Venezuelan migration in Brazil using a mixed-methods approach. From a 
theoretical perspective, this work highlights the value of the contributions of the new mobilities 
scholars to the social sciences. Specifically, the dialectics that they have proposed—whether 
between mobility and immobility or deterritorialization and reterritorialization—have strong 
empirical explanatory power and offer sophisticated insights into the complex transformation of 
strategies within mobility regimes. Perhaps the most critical contribution of these scholars, as it 
relates to this project, is the relatively ambivalent nature of mobility as a resource. Such an 
insight serves as an impetus to ask more critical questions, as I have done throughout this work, 
to further understand the conditions that facilitate or inhibit different forms of mobility. 
Furthermore, mobility scholars’ emphasis on mobility as both a discursive representation and 
embodied practice was particularly useful for underscoring the ways in which several different 
agents participate within the mobility regime and exert power over mobility at different points.  
 Secondly, from a methodological standpoint, my work illustrates the value of local and 
national news sources as a way of understanding not only dominant discourses, but also to 
understand the daily, lived experiences of these regimes at a closer level. One of the most notable 
gaps in my project was the fact that I was unable to conduct extensive fieldwork. In particular, 
the voice of the migrant is clearly missing from this piece. Initially, I was concerned that these 
limitations would prevent me from being able to produce a piece of work that was relevant to the 
specific conditions of the Venezuela-Brazil border. However, I was happily surprised to find that 
a wide variety of the news articles that I reviewed provided a deeply ethnographic picture of the 
border. Especially considering many of the journalists act as ‘researchers in the field’, they were 
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not only able to glean critical insights about the migrant experience, but they also could speak to 
the reality of the border being residents of the region themselves (or having spent swaths of time 
there). It was a formative experience to be able to review these articles because, upon identifying 
the disparities between the stories recounted in secondary sources and the stories presented in the 
articles, I was able to see for myself the selective process that researchers must constantly engage 
in to pull specific points of interest from primary data. This exercise—seeing what elements in 
the articles stuck out to me that other researchers had not previously noted—helped me to better 
understand and recognize my own particular interests and contributions as a researcher.  
 Last, this project holds key empirical insights for those engaged in the response to 
Venezuelan migration in Brazil, whether from an academic, professional, or personal 
perspective. While conducting initial research for this project, I found that, because of the 
overwhelming positive and humanitarian response that the Brazilian government has launched, 
many people on the international stage somewhat overlooked some of the more concerning 
issues present in Roraima. Specifically, many sources reduced all of the instances I discussed in 
Chapter IV to “some local instances of xenophobia,” which does not necessarily capture the 
nature of the violence that exists at the border, nor the broader historical and social context of 
this violence that I discussed in Chapter II. As well, there has been little attention paid to the role 
of the police and military in the response, although they play an integral role in Operação 
Acolhida. Recognizing some of the early signs of issues that I have signaled in this project will 
be crucial going forward. I just recently saw a headline about a police invasion of a shelter in 
Roraima and the subsequent arrest of a nun that worked there. Especially in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, researchers must pay attention to the transformation of how police power 
is exercised within the mobility regime. Furthermore, as traffic continues to increase throughout 
95 
the region and the mobility regime continues to adapt to this, it will be critical to pay attention to 
the historical forms of colonialism in Roraima and current opportunities and challenges both for 
indigenous migrants and indigenous residents that I have highlighted through this piece. 
Specifically, more work that builds upon this understanding of the ways in which mobility is 
differentially practiced and experienced among the varied indigenous community in the region, 
such as the Warao and Pemón, would be incredibly beneficial to building more appropriate and 
strategic solutions.  
 
Policy implications 
Finally, I want to end by emphasizing that glamorous policy solutions such as the 
interiorization program cannot replace a long-term integration strategy for the state of Roraima. 
Roraima has long been stuck in a kind of limbo, having served as somewhat of a ‘playground’ 
for the Brazilian state to enact a variety of different policies and projects when it was strategic 
for the nation, few of which have really been sustained over time. Roraima needs a long-term 
strategy that will address the socio-economic needs of local residents and Venezuelan migrants 
alike, while also respecting the sovereignty and land rights of the extensive networks of 
indigenous communities that have historically occupied the region. More generally, it is time for 
the Brazilian state to develop a more agile and robust migratory framework. Many of the 
government actions and policies I have discussed in this work are initiatives propelled by 
specific politicians. It is unclear how the country will choose to deal with these migratory flows 
under future administrations. Similarly, many of these measures apply exclusively to Venezuelan 
migrants. If and when the next major influx from a neighboring country occurs, Brazil will find 
itself once again instituting provisionary measures to quickly work to accommodate migrants. 
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Although there will inevitably be pendular struggles between deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization, by focusing on long-term policy solutions rather than reactionary measures, 
Brazil could better anticipate and account for these territorial struggles.  
